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Introduction 
David Pier 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 
Global Africana Review is a scholarly journal for undergraduates, which adheres to the rigorous 
editorial procedures of any professional academic journal. We openly invite students to submit 
original research articles on any and all topics having to do with Africa, African Americans, and 
the broader African diaspora. Submissions that meet our editorial board’s standards for academic 
rigor and originality are sent out for review to faculty members with specialized knowledge of 
the topics in question. Articles that pass this review are then revised by their authors, 
resubmitted, professionally edited and proofread, and published. This vetting and revision 
process ensures that students take their research and writing projects to the highest possible level, 
producing polished, sophisticated, and useful contributions to ongoing disciplinary conversations 
in global Africana Studies. 
We take great pride in our first issue, which features five articles that reflect the multi-
disciplinary diversity and global range of the AAAD department. The first two articles deal with 
the complexities of African politics at the intersection of the state/intergovernmental 
organizations and civil society. Rebekah Cockram writes about the late Kenyan activist Wangari 
Maathai’s Green Belt Movement and its achievements in the areas of women’s rights and 
environmental sustainability. Danielle Allyn discusses the shortcomings of the UN’s 
peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO, arguing that the 
mission has remained in some ways fatally detached from the people it was designed to protect. 
Next, drawing on interviews with Haitian poultry processing workers in Maryland, Emily 
Sheffield uncovers an array of obstacles these immigrants face in seeking basic health care in the 
United States. Language barriers compounded with racism make it especially difficult for these 
Haitians to negotiate the bureaucratic systems that control their access to essential health care 
and services. Tackling similar issues, but on the other side of the Atlantic, Amukelani Muyanga 
explores the rising ethnic xenophobia in South Africa, home to a multitude of immigrants from 
diverse other African countries who came originally as migrant laborers or war refugees. India 
Benson also writes about South Africa, but from a humanities perspective, executing a close, 
multifaceted reading of a spider-themed sculpture by the important contemporary artist Mary 
Sibande. 
In addition to the five research articles, our issue presents Mary Quattlebaum’s review of 
Laurent Dubois’s book, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution. For 
future issues, we welcome student submissions of book reviews and other short pieces pertaining 
to the journal’s themes, in addition to full-length research manuscripts. 
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Agents of Rights-Based Justice: Wangari Maathai and 
Kenya's Green Belt Movement 
Rebekah Cockram 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores key debates about agents of justice in the human rights field. It analyzes the 
gains and limitations of NGOs that act as agents of rights-based justice by exploring Wangari 
Maathai’s Green Belt Movement and its growth and impact in Kenya. Special attention is given 
to the indivisibility of rights, specifically environmental, civil, political, and social rights, by 
highlighting the development of the Green Belt Movement from a social arena in the late 1970s 
to a political arena in the late 1990s. As NGOs like the Green Belt Movement have worked to 
address direct hardships, such as environmental degradation, they have revealed deeper problems 
of disempowerment and disenfranchisement in the areas they serve, which in turn has validated 
the need for the international community to look beyond states as the primary agents of justice. 
Keywords: justice, human rights, environment, social movements, Wangari Maathai 
 
 
Introduction 
Human Rights are the rights we have simply because we are human beings. In 1948, the UN 
General Assembly composed The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), which, in 
addition to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, remains the primary instrument 
of human rights. Together, the three instruments compose the International Bill of Human 
Rights, which promotes equal, universal, and inalienable rights for all. Instruments of human 
rights tend to principally focus on the rights and entitlements that individuals should enjoy by 
virtue of being human, as opposed to the realization of those rights for the individual. This 
approach is often linked to the presupposition that states have the responsibility to guarantee 
human rights as the primary agents of justice. However, this is problematic as it fails to 
acknowledge the alternate agents of justice needed in cases when states act as agents of injustice 
and choose to do nothing to support and implement a human rights agenda. 
Using Kenya’s Green Belt Movement as a case study, this article explores the gains and 
limitations of alternate agents of rights-based justice. It is primarily situated in debates within the 
field of human rights concerned with definitions of what is an agent of rights-based justice. It is 
organized into three broad sections. First, it explores the theory of rights-based justice. Second, it 
analyzes the Green Belt Movement as an agent of rights-based justice, and finally it highlights 
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the core women’s rights and environmental rights campaigns of the Green Belt Movement 
through a human rights perspective. 
 
Agents of Rights-Based Justice 
In the charter of the 1948 UNDHR, and in other international human rights instruments such as 
the 1966 Covenants of Human Rights, there is an implicit assumption that the implementation of 
rights is an obligation of the state. Article 15 of the UNDHR declares: 
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality. (UN General Assembly 1948) 
By highlighting that individuals are members of a state as a result of having a right to a 
nationality, Article 15 presupposes that states assume the roles of both protector and guarantor of 
human rights as agents of justice. This argument is furthered by Onora O’Neill, a well respected 
contributor to debates on international justice. O’Neill argues that it is through Article 15 “that a 
plurality of bounded states – explicitly anti-cosmopolitan institutions – are installed as the 
primary agents of justice, who are to deliver universal rights” (2001, 185). Meanwhile, an 
alternative argument that validates states as the primary agents of justice is proposed by Jack 
Donnelly (2013, 29), who suggests that the centrality of states is clear when the differences 
between positive and negative rights in the UNDHR are deconstructed. Positive rights can be 
conceptualized in terms of action as they require states to work toward their realization. They 
include the rights to work, health, education, and an adequate standard of living. Conversely, 
negative rights are typically understood in terms of inaction as they require others to respect the 
rights of the individual by not interfering. Examples of negative rights include the rights to life, 
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. However, Donnelly argues 
against such a polarized categorization of rights, contesting instead that for a state to guarantee 
the negative rights of its citizens it must enact positive programs. The right to protection against 
torture, for example, requires that states abstain from the deliberate infliction of physical or 
psychological pain against their citizens; but to achieve this, a state must initiate positive 
programs that educate and control law enforcement personnel, such as the police force that 
represents it (Donnelly 2013, 30). Whether we accept O’Neill’s analysis of Article 15 and the 
importance of the right to nationality, or Donnelly’s argument about the role of states in 
implementing positive and negative rights, the underlying foundation that states assume the 
primary responsibility for acting as agents of justice is the same. Both authors do agree that, 
while there is some emphasis on states as agents of justice, the UNDHR is still recipient centric 
(Donnelly 2013, 34; O’Neill 2001, 183). Thus, while there is consensus that states are agents of 
justice, one of the greatest limitations of the UNDHR is its failure to delineate how a state should 
implement and ensure human rights for its citizens. 
While many states have voluntarily adopted international human rights instruments such as 
the UNDHR and the 1966 Covenants, the state’s role as a primary agent of justice must be 
critically examined. The modern state has the capacity to act as both the primary agent for the 
protection and enforcement of human rights, as well as the primary threat when it acts as an 
agent of injustice (Donnelly 2013, 34). To uncover what may lead a state to act as an agent of 
injustice, I will briefly address three situations that are especially pertinent to debates around 
rights-based justice. The first scenario is concerned with capabilities and resources. If a state 
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lacks the natural resources, human capital, and/or organizational structures necessary to enforce 
human rights, or if its capabilities have been assumed, forcibly or consensually, by another actor 
operating within the state, then it cannot play an active role in fulfilling the rights of its citizens 
(O’Neill 2001, 189). Secondly, some states may have the power to act as a primary agent of 
justice, but choose not to use this power to advance a human rights agenda because of state 
corruption or stake weakness. This situation involves the role of state agency and highlights a 
problem of having no international human rights enforcement mechanisms that apply to states. 
Lastly, O’Neill suggests that when state power is used “for other ends” this can include ends 
with “a great deal of injustice” (2001, 189). States may fail to act as an agent of justice as they 
consolidate power, as in the case of Kenya, where human rights abuses were committed in the 
colonial period and then reproduced during the eras of President Jomo Kenyatta and President 
Daniel arap Moi. The limitations of states as agents of human rights, augmented by a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, have thus created instances where states work against human rights, 
thereby creating tension between human rights rhetoric and practice. 
Many states do not fulfil their role as a primary agent of justice, and this has led scholars of 
human rights to contend that we must rethink what should act as an agent of rights-based justice. 
Increasingly, human rights scholars such as O’Neill and Florian Wettstein call us to consider 
non-state actors, such as civil society organizations, international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs), multi-national corporations (MNCs), and trans-national corporations 
(TNCs), as agents of justice. Those who support the role of these organizations as an agent of 
justice believe they are qualified – and even responsible – to act in this capacity because of their 
extensive capabilities, which afford them both substantive and structural forms of power. In this 
way, global organizations can act opportunistically to influence the economy and govern people 
by filling the “global regulatory vacuum” that states have created (Bonanno 2010, 491–92). 
O’Neill (2001, 192) proposes that INGOs can play a pivotal role in securing human rights in 
states where they operate because of their access to key players across the globe, while Wettstein 
suggests that we should consider MNCs as agents of human rights because they have the “most 
extensive capabilities to make positive contributions to the [global] transformation of unjust 
situations into just ones” (2009, 9). Thus, the idea behind global organizations as agents of 
justice is that they must use their agency and capabilities to enact positive programs based on 
their positive duties to improve the lives, security, and rights of those in need (Werhane 2012, 
193–98). 
Other human rights scholars who work from an institutional perspective of human rights 
propose that major institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), should be considered as agents of justice. Thomas Pogge (2002) advances this argument 
and suggests that dominant global institutions, as well as rich countries and rich individuals, have 
the negative responsibility to be primary agents of rights-based justice. However, although 
Wettstein and Pogge argue that major global institutions should be considered as primary agents 
of justice due to their extensive capabilities, Wettstein also acknowledges that individual citizens 
have historically exerted a significant influence on state politics through collective action (2009, 
9). Wettstein’s argument is particularly useful for contextualizing the global rise in civil society 
groups such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the past three decades, the number 
of NGOs has increased into the millions, with exact numbers being difficult to determine given 
that not all NGOs are registered. A study conducted by Hall-Jones reported that, “the NGO 
sector now constitutes the 8th largest economy in the world – representing over $1 trillion 
annually, 19 million paid workers and countless volunteers, and $15 billion in development aid 
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every year” (McArthur 2008, 60). Thus, while MNCs and INCs may have extensive capabilities, 
the rise of civil society groups such as NGOs must not be underestimated. 
The position of NGOs and their growing influence is an international phenomenon. This 
paper addresses NGOs in the context of Africa, as it examines Wangari Maathai’s Green Belt 
Movement in Kenya. In Africa, NGOs now play dominant roles in the practice of human rights 
and the rule of law by adopting a rights-based approach to development work that often centers a 
particular group or issue – the Green Belt Movement centers women and the environment – 
which means that they use the concept of rights to set agendas and priorities, and to allocate 
resources (Welch 2004, 207). A rights-based approach to development adds utilitarian value to 
the work of NGOs, which can leverage their rights agendas to influence donors that they know 
can in turn influence the state to acknowledge and enforce the rights in question (Nelson and 
Dorsey 2003, 2013–2026). However, NGOs do not have the same capabilities to act as agents of 
justice as dominant global institutions, because they depend on money from private donors and 
inter-state institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank. In addition, and as the 
work of Makau Mutua advances, NGOs face significant challenges in their human rights work.1 
However, the numerous paradoxes that NGOs face do not negate their capacity to defend and 
enforce human rights. NGOs’ power also comes from their ability to exercise soft power through 
campaigns and strategies that make them “powerful engines for organizing and driving policy 
change” (Kettl 2000, 491). Through these strategies, NGOs, such as the Green Belt Movement, 
continue to act as agents of justice as they advance certain political objectives, using their 
influence to positively impact the communities they serve. 
 
Non-State Actors as Agents of Human Rights: The Case of the Green Belt Movement 
The Green Belt Movement emerged in 1977 and developed in a post-colonial authoritarian 
context, particularly under the 1978–2008 regime of President Moi. While the Kenyan state 
under President Moi was marked by a deepening authoritarianism, the centralization of political 
power and overall human rights abuses were already present in the era of British-settler 
colonialism and the immediate post-colonial state under President Kenyatta, who governed from 
1964 to 1978. During the era of British settler colonialism, the colonizers denied Kenyans basic 
land rights and civil liberties. President Kenyatta adopted a more authoritarian form of 
government and centralized power, as his regime evolved into a de facto one party state 
(Anderson 2005). Under President Moi, the government became increasingly repressive after the 
1982 coup, and his “centralization and personalization of power gradually laid the foundation for 
a dictatorship and innumerable human rights violations by his administration” (Adar, Korwar, 
and Munyae 2001, 2). It was in this context that the Green Belt Movement evolved as an agent of 
rights-based justice in Kenya. While there is an inherent tension between NGOs growing and 
acting as agents of justice and states that are agents of injustice, NGOs such as the Green Belt 
Movement can grow without state opposition because their stated objectives rarely explicitly 
promote human rights, but instead create scenarios where human rights discussions become more 
pervasive (Welch 2004, 207). This analysis is affirmed when we consider the history of Wangari 
Maathai’s Green Belt Movement and analyze how it developed over time. 
	  
																																								 																				
1 For specific case studies, see Makau Mutua, Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and 
Normative Tensions, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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The Green Belt Movement’s Promotion of Women’s Rights and Environmental Rights 
As a grassroots NGO, the Green Belt Movement was set up to respond to the social and 
environmental problems that Wangari Maathai witnessed in Kenya. Maathai’s involvement with 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) led her to observe that, despite Kenya’s 
economic progress under President Kenyatta, Kenyan women in rural areas were suffering from 
malnourishment because of overflowing dirty rivers, a lack of fodder and grass for domestic 
animals, and nutrient-depleted soil (Maathai 2006, 121). Such issues of environmental 
degradation, deforestation, and food insecurity led Maathai to found the Green Belt Movement in 
1977 with the support of the National Council of Women in Kenya (NCWK). The cooperative 
efforts of the Green Belt Movement initially attracted financial support from the NCWK and 
Mobil Oil, Kenya, two of the few domestic organizations to respond to Maathai’s request for 
funding (Maathai 2006, 134). 
While early support from within Kenya was crucial for the initial success of the Green Belt 
Movement, this support was limited. As Maathai acknowledges, only a few organizations 
responded to her petition for funding and these funds were restricted (2006, 134). In the early 
1980s, the Green Belt Movement attracted more international investment, which enabled 
Maathai to accept the position of coordinator. In this role, she accepted funds from the 
Norwegian Forestry Society and the UN Voluntary Fund for Women, which approved a grant of 
$122,700 (USD) (Maathai 2006, 169). According to Maathai, 
The Voluntary Fund’s grant was crucial because it let me expand the Green Belt Movement’s 
activities. Coming from a UN agency, that grant gave the Green Belt Movement a certain 
legitimacy that helped other funders feel secure as we sought support from them. (2006, 168) 
In particular, the feeling of security that the new funds brought enabled the Green Belt 
Movement to broaden its approach to furthering women’s rights. 
 
The Green Belt Movement and Women’s Rights 
In terms of women’s rights, the Green Belt Movement’s primary strategy from 1977 to 1988 was 
twofold: to empower women by paying them to grow seedlings, and to provide the women with 
an environmental education. Maathai predicted that planting trees would improve the 
community’s quality of life, as the trees would not only provide shade and a supply of wood and 
food for the community, but also bind the soil to protect the community from watersheds 
(Maathai 2006, 168). Thus, Maathai aimed to demonstrate how improving the environment to 
give people the resources they needed could also lead to improved lives and livelihoods. 
To realize its stated goals, the Green Belt Movement provided paid incentives for women to 
plant seedlings and establish public greenbelts. Mobilizing the women to plant trees gave them 
an active way to deal with their hunger and poverty, while also developing their autonomy and 
self-confidence. Tree planting was effective because it was inexpensive, “simple, visible and 
replicable” and also “a low technology undertaking” (Michaelson 1994, 550). In addition, the 
women benefited from the tree planting, as the payment they earned for planting new trees 
boosted their income and the trees provided tangible resources such as wood and fruit. The 
visibility of the rewards encouraged participation and increased interest in the movement so that, 
by 1992, Maathai reported: “to date, some 10 million trees have been planted and have survived 
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– a survival rate of about 70-80 per cent. Up to 80,000 women are today involved in work at 
nursery sites” (as cited in Michaelson 1994, 551). 
The success of the Green Belt Movement in terms of trees planted is easily quantifiable, 
while the educational and personal impacts for the women involved are less so. Maathai’s broad 
notion of development began to restore women’s visible worth in the community, as they were 
given the resources to create a tangible difference in the lives of their families. This encouraged 
people to question the reasons behind their circumstances, and to “begin to question power on 
local, national, and global levels” (Mbaku 1998, 172). The strategic educational component of 
the Green Belt Movement thus increased public consciousness, and, according to Michaelson, “it 
is precisely these ‘consciousness raising’ activities that lie at the heart of social transformation” 
(1994, 552). 
The Green Belt Movement, initially focused on being a social arena for Kenyan women, 
succeeded in Kenya due to its non-confrontational approach to politics (Michaelson 1994, 546). 
In addition, its early success can be attributed to the fact that its environmental concerns were 
aligned with the reforestation and environmental education goals of the Kenyan government’s 
development program. As an agent of human rights, the Green Belt Movement sought to bridge 
the gap between the Kenyan government’s development strategy and its lack of implementation, 
especially concerning the environment and women. 
Nevertheless, while the Green Belt Movement’s aims coincided with those of the Kenyan 
government, such an analysis does not do justice to the strategic efforts of the Green Belt 
Movement and other NGOs like it. Wettstein argues that social movements can be described as 
movements that operate as “challengers, seeking goals that they are unable to pursue through 
institutionalized political processes” (2009, 335). Social movements, in other words, do not 
occur in a vacuum, but work within political opportunity structures that set parameters within 
which NGOs can operate and help NGOs highlight their concerns through strategic framing 
processes. According to Jutta Joachim, once the frames are identified, the ability of an NGO to 
be accepted by a government is contingent upon the interaction of two factors: 
First, the political opportunity structure in which NGOs are embedded, which is defined by 
access to international institutions, the presence of powerful allies, and changes in political 
alignments or conflicts; and second, the mobilizing structures that NGOs have at their own 
disposal comprising organizational entrepreneurs, an international constituency, and experts. 
(2003, 247) 
The Green Belt Movement successfully engaged with these two factors: first, Maathai gained the 
support and sponsorship of the Norwegian Forestry Society and the UN Voluntary Fund for 
Women, which served as “powerful allies”; second, she drew on her masters of biology from the 
University of Pittsburgh and her knowledge of environmental restoration to provide the relevant 
expertise and leadership for the movement (Maathai 2006, 93–94). These strategies combined to 
increase the impact and success of the movement as Maathai utilized the resources around her to 
respond to the needs of the community around her. 
 
The Politicization of The Green Belt Movement 
In the late 1980s, the Green Belt Movement evolved to become more overtly engaged in the 
public political arena, which led the ruling elite in Kenya to construct it as an enemy of the 
Kenyan state. The evolution of the Green Belt Movement from a social arena in the late 1970s to 
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a political arena in the late 1980s further supports the theory of NGOs acting within a political 
opportunity structure. In the beginning, the work of the Green Belt Movement was limited to 
women planting seedlings, and the mission was environmental. This framing was necessary so 
that the Green Belt Movement aligned with the stated environmental goals of the Kenyan 
government. However, what began as a simple plan to plant seedlings led to the mobilization of 
thousands of Kenyan women, which, over time, increased the influence and legitimacy of the 
Green Belt Movement and led to its eventual politicization. 
As the Green Belt Movement received more funding, it could expand its capabilities and 
vision and implement new initiatives. Maathai describes this transition through the metaphor of a 
tree: “the Green Belt Movement grew from a tree-planting program into one that planted ideas as 
well” (2006, 173). In its initial incarnation, from 1977 to 1988, the Green Belt Movement sought 
to address societal problems such as the environment and the position of women through 
reforestation and education. Then, from 1989 to 1994, the Green Belt Movement evolved and 
became more confrontational toward the Kenyan political system, interrogating the political 
processes at the root of environmental and women’s issues. By the late 1980s, Maathai had 
recognized that “deeper issues of disempowerment, disenfranchisement, and a loss 
of…traditional values” were preventing communities from protecting their lives and the 
environment around them (The Green Belt Movement 2017). With this in mind, leaders of the 
Green Belt Movement began to advocate for issues around democracy, human rights, gender, 
and power by holding civil and environmental education seminars. Taking action in this way 
encouraged dialogue about the impact of colonialism and empowered people to demand more 
accountability from national leaders (Maathai 2006, 174). The tremendous growth of the Green 
Belt Movement from 1977 to 1988 signaled not only increased environmental awareness, but 
also increased political awareness. By the late 1980s, the Green Belt Movement had achieved 
increased mobilization of women and this enabled it to grow in relevance and influence. Once it 
became more influential, it could begin to manipulate the political opportunity structure that it 
evolved in, and become more strategic in its methods “by gaining institutional access, mobilizing 
support from influential allies, and exploiting changes in political alignments and conflicts” 
(Joachim 2003, 269). 
The shifted focus of the Green Belt Movement in the late 1980s that led to the politicization 
of its mission became especially relevant from 1989 to 1994 in the context of deepening 
authoritarianism in the one-party state of President Moi. According to Adar and Munyae, 
“Detentions and political trials, torture, arbitrary arrests and police brutality reminiscent of the 
colonial era became common” as President Moi cemented his authoritarian stance (2001, 6). 
Even as the political landscape changed between 1989 and 1991, as opposition to the concept of 
a one-party state mounted, President Moi continued to criminalize opposition. For example, 
section 5(10)(d) of the Public Security Act justified the arrest of political dissenters and made it 
illegal to hold public gatherings without a state license (Florence 2014, chap. 10). In analyzing 
Maathai’s political involvement against the sky-scraper in Uhuru Park, this context must be 
taken into account. It was Maathai’s first and most public anti-government campaign, where she 
personally became more publicly vocal and adversarial. The next section focuses on the Green 
Belt Movement’s involvement in Uhuru Park, but the movement also notably became more 
involved in broader pro-democracy movements in Kenya, such as the Free Political Prisoners 
campaign, from the late 1980s onward. 
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The Green Belt Movement and the Struggle for Green Spaces in Kenya 
In 1989, President Moi’s government announced its plan to construct the Kenya Times Media 
Trust (KTMT) Complex, a 60-story sky-scraper valued at $200 million, in Uhuru Park. Part of 
the development included a 30-foot statue of President Moi, and the sky-scraper was to function 
as a shopping mall, parking area, office space, and as the headquarters of KANU. Uhuru Park, 
also known as Freedom Park, is a 12.9-hectare recreational park in downtown Nairobi. It is an 
important green space for people living and working in Kenya because it provides a break from 
the busy pace of city life. In contrast to Kenya’s elite, who have access to gardens and private 
parks, for Nairobi’s poor, it is their only recreation site (Florence 2014, chap. 10). Maathai 
vehemently opposed the construction because, if erected, “the proposed complex would encroach 
on the park and diminish its usefulness as a public recreation area” (Florence 2014, chap. 10). 
Maathai soon became the leading opponent of the project among other oppositionists, which 
included the Public Law Institute, the National Museums of Kenya, and the Architectural 
Association of Kenya. 
Maathai’s opposition movement began by rallying within Kenya, but was met with little 
support. On November 24th, 1989, Maathai filed a lawsuit with the High Court seeking a 
permanent injunction against the proposed sky-scraper. The court dismissed her request, and 
Justice Norbury Dugdale ruled that, “Maathai as an individual had no locus standi on behalf of 
the public. The only authority empowered to institute such a suit would be the attorney general” 
(Michaelson 1994, 553). Maathai contacted the attorney general to advance her request, but he 
refused to support the injunction. After Maathai had spoken out about the plan publicly, 
President Moi responded to her opposition by saying that “she had no right to criticize the 
government because African tradition requires women to respect men” (Cad 1990, 7). The 
Nairobi police then ordered the Green Belt Movement to leave the offices that they had occupied 
for ten years. In response to the regime’s dismissal of her opposition, Maathai turned to her 
international political alliances. She built up opposition against the regime by appealing to 
various institutions, including the director of the National Museums of Kenya, UNESCO, the 
British High Commissioner in Nairobi, Sir John Johnson, as well as to the public (Florence 2014, 
chap. 10). Maathai received further criticism from the government for eliciting international 
support, especially from the British, given the context of colonialism. According to Michaelson, 
however, Maathai’s strategy to seek international support is “an excellent example of the 
utilization of international political alliances by a social movement actor to manipulate a desired 
outcome in the domestic arena” (as cited in Pagnucco, Smith, and Crist 1992, 21). 
Maathai’s desired outcome was granted in January 1990 when the government finally ended 
the proposal, but the numerous impacts of the campaign on the Green Belt Movement were 
likely not anticipated by Maathai when she first got involved. While her “long and lonely 
crusade had finally ended in victory,” the Green Belt Movement had now lost the few 
connections they previously had to the government that had enabled them to initially flourish 
(Michaelson 1994, 553). She additionally lost some members of the Green Belt Movement who 
feared that their association would result in negative political repercussions. On the other hand, 
Maathai did achieve significant international acclaim and garnered a visible profile that 
encouraged support from international investors. Her success thus demonstrated that collective 
political action could achieve results and influence national politics. 
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The Green Belt Movement: Critical Concluding Reflections 
Despite a period of political oppression that had some negative consequences for the Green Belt 
Movement, the organization continued to operate as an agent of justice by pursuing a rights-
based approach to development that empowered female subsistence farmers in Kenya. Much of 
the success of the Green Belt Movement, including its longevity, can be attributed to this 
approach, out of which Maathai’s team began to explore the “underexploited links” between 
different types of rights (Nelson and Dorsey 2003, 2015). Maathai’s understanding of the 
indivisibility of rights and her multi-pronged definition of development allowed her to perceive 
the interconnectedness of the environment, women, and development in her work. In her 
memoir, Unbowed, Maathai states, “I became convinced that we needed to identify the roots of 
the disempowerment that plagued the Kenyan people,” suggesting that she was opposed to 
focusing on surface-level problems (2006, 173). Her broader approach to human rights earned 
her praise from the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which awarded her the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2004 and acknowledged her “connections between peace, environmentalism, democracy, 
sustainable development and the importance of human rights, particularly women’s rights, on 
international politics” (Muthuki 2006, 86). 
Recognizing the interconnectedness of rights agendas has been a powerful tool in enabling 
NGOs, such as the Green Belt Movement, to hold governments accountable when they use both 
their donors and the position they have built up in the community as political leverage to enforce 
social change. Drawing on both her earlier efforts, which focused on tree planting and education, 
and her more politically driven activities in the late 1980s, Maathai linked the underlying 
problems of disenfranchisement and disempowerment that women in Kenya were experiencing 
to the structural adjustment programs of the Bretton Woods institutions that were adversely 
impacting Kenya. Maathai drew conclusions along the same lines as Janet Muthuki, who argues 
that colonial rule’s introduction of a global capitalist economy contributed to the marginalization 
and economic dependency of women (Muthuki 2006, 87). The complex history of these deep-
rooted problems became a point of contention and political dispute between Maathai and the 
Kenyan authorities, who began to see the work and anti-patriarchal message of the Green Belt 
Movement as a threat. 
In advocating for women’s rights, Maathai focused her efforts on “strategic gender interests,” 
as opposed to the “practical gender interests” that traditional women’s organizations in Kenya, 
allied with the Kenya African National Union (KANU), had focused on (Sahle 1998). The ethos 
behind Maathai’s strategic gender interests was at the heart of the Green Belt Movement. From 
the beginning, she believed that growth in democracy was positively correlated with helping 
women to understand the environmental issues of their own land and communities. The biggest 
gain for women under the Green Belt Movement was thus an expansion of their traditional 
capabilities. According to Amartya Sen, “the freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood 
in terms of people’s capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be what they have 
reason to value” (1999, 174). The Green Belt Movement provided women with the opportunities 
to make decisions about their lives, and thereby acted as a primary agent of justice by increasing 
their capabilities and freedoms. 
As discussed, the Green Belt Movement further facilitated discussions about 
disenfranchisement and disempowerment through “civic and environmental education” seminars. 
According to Maathai, in 1990, the seminars examined “the recent history of Kenya and how 
forests and land had been used and distributed in the colonial era and after independence” (2006, 
174). 
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proved to be especially important in giving rights to women. Education about human rights is 
integral to female empowerment, as policy changes to improve women’s situations require a 
strong educational component to help change attitudes. Therefore, the aim of NGOs to give 
individuals “a right to participate” is key to both the sustainability of their work and to the 
empowerment of the individuals they are working with, as it allows those individuals to take 
“substantial control over the project” (Nelson and Dorsey 2003, 2017). This notion of education 
and participation was a particular strength of the Green Belt Movement and a key contributing 
factor in its growth. 
Maathai’s strong advocacy for women’s rights in conjunction with the Green Belt Movement 
incited gendered political backlash. In the process of leading campaigns to prevent deforestation, 
end poor governance, and end human rights atrocities, she was “tear-gassed, jailed for leading 
protests, clubbed unconscious by riot police and received anonymous death threats” (Muthuki 
2006, 85). While she tried to fight against the oppression of women in Kenya, she became a 
symbol of the challenges faced by African women in trying to demand equal representation and 
participation in government. As she encouraged women to demand that the government provide 
them with what they needed, she made herself an enemy of the state (Maathai 2006, 173). As 
outlined above, this relationship became especially dangerous as the Green Belt Movement 
united with others in opposition against the government’s decision to construct the Kenya Times 
Media Complex in Uhuru Park. Acting as an agent of rights-based justice against the patriarchal 
and capitalist mindset of the Kenyan government thus led the Green Belt Movement, and 
Maathai herself, to eventually lose all support from the Kenyan government. 
While the work of the Green Belt Movement has led to several gains for women and the 
environment, achievement of equal rights and development remains a contentious issue in 
Kenya. While Kenya has developed a national policy on gender and development framed within 
the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) process, Kenyan women still face challenges in attaining 
gender equality due to strong patriarchal influences. According to Muthuki, “the colonial legacy 
of a patriarchal state, a system that African male political leaders adopted at independence, 
ensures that African systems continue to represent systems that prioritize and uphold male 
privilege” (2006, 87). Nonetheless, the 2010 Kenyan democratic constitution has provided many 
more opportunities for women in recent years, such as an expansion of women’s rights to include 
property rights and the chance for women to have greater representation in the government 
(Blyth, 2013). 
The work that Maathai achieved in the Green Belt Movement and the struggles that the 
movement faced over time provide a valuable case study of the opportunities and paradoxes that 
non-state actors encounter when they act as agents of justice. In states where human rights are 
abused and unequally distributed, we have seen an increase in the number of grassroots NGOs, 
which develop to deal with focused societal problems that often affect a specific demographic. In 
the case of the Green Belt Movement, the societal problems that Maathai hoped to alleviate 
broadened over time, from developing women’s capabilities to changing the patriarchal political 
landscape that fostered the gendered inequalities to start with. As the status of NGOs develops, 
and support and funding networks broaden, their capacity to act as agents of justice similarly 
increases. It is, however, difficult to use the language of capabilities within the context of NGOs, 
because, as Wettstein (2009) advances, NGOs are so reliant upon international funding that this 
can sometimes limit their autonomy. Moreover, the increase in NGOs in Africa, which are 
adopting a rights-based approach to development such as that taken by the Green Belt 
Movement, while leading to greater empowerment for individuals, has also led to state hostility. 
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This tension is significant as it highlights the need for alternate agents of justice to act in states – 
as in this case in Kenya – where governments do nothing to support and implement a human 
rights agenda. As a grassroots civil society organization, the Green Belt Movement must 
therefore be praised as an effective challenger of the Kenyan government, and further, as an 
agent of justice that has empowered individuals with greater capabilities and freedom. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter, the DRC, DR Congo, or “Congo”) remains 
home to one of the largest humanitarian crises since the Second World War. As the largest and 
longest-running UN peacekeeping force in the organization’s history, the UN Stabilization 
Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO) boasts a civilian protection record characterized by 
limited success. During the late 1990s, a series of peacekeeping failures inspired a series of 
scholarly critiques and UN reforms. International political will coalesced around the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). MONUSCO represents a test case for the operationalization of 
R2P. This paper analyzes UN Security Council Resolutions 2098 and 2147 and their impact on 
MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians in eastern DRC. Drawing on interviews with UN 
personnel and Congolese civilians, the paper constructs a case for the limited operational success 
of UNSC 2098 on measures of civilian protection. 
Keywords: peacekeeping, United Nations, conflict resolution, central Africa, interventionism 
 
 
Introduction 
With an estimated 5 to 6 million fatalities since 1994, the conflict in the eastern part of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains the world’s deadliest since the conclusion of 
the Second World War. MONUSCO, the mission in place in the DRC since 2010, remains the 
UN’s largest, most expensive, and longest-running peacekeeping force (MONUSCO 2014). 
MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians – and thus prevent fatalities – is the subject of this 
paper. 
The geography of eastern Congo is complex and often unforgiving. At 2,344,858 square 
kilometers, the DRC is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa and the eleventh largest country 
in the world. Nearly two-thirds of Congolese civilians live in remote rural areas, and dense 
vegetation in the DRC’s eastern provinces often provides shelter for armed groups (CIA World 
Factbook 2014). Given these realities, it comes as no surprise that MONUSCO demands a large 
share of UN peacekeeping resources. As MONUSCO possesses adequate numbers of personnel 
and the financial resources needed for meeting the demands of this challenging peacekeeping 
environment, the explanation for the mission’s shortcomings must be found elsewhere.  
While MONUSCO’s current mandate, which dates to UNSC Resolution 2098 (March 2013), 
lists four distinct objectives, this paper focuses on the first mission objective: the protection of 
Congolese civilians. The mandate aims to quell simmering violence in the DRC’s eastern 
provinces, conceptualized as North and South Kivu and Orientale. The UNSC reaffirmed 
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MONUSCO’s expanded authority under the 2013 mandate by issuing UNSC Resolution 2147 
(2014). This paper examines the extent to which greater peacekeeping latitude for MONUSCO 
translates into peace dividends for Congolese civilians. In doing so, I rely on a series of semi-
structured interviews with Congolese community members and UN staff (both foreign and 
Congolese).1 The interview excerpts offer insight into assessments of MONUSCO’s prior and 
current performance, and address the tangible impact of the 2013 resolution.  
To begin, I present the following question: to what extent has an increase in MONUSCO’s 
peacekeeping authority, as contained in UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013), translated into an 
increased capacity to protect civilians? In response, I argue that while assessments of 
MONUSCO do in fact reflect observable progress in the mission’s capacity to protect civilians, 
these capacity developments fall short of both the initial enthusiasm accompanying Resolution 
2098 and the “peace dividends” – measurable increases in civilian security – that might be 
reasonably expected in the nearly one and a half years between March 2013 and the time of data 
collection (June and July 2014). To explain the gap between the expected and observed progress, 
I contest that the mission possesses three key internal shortcomings that limit its ability to 
adequately fulfill its primary objective of protecting Congolese civilians. These limitations 
include lack of uniformity in the internalization of human rights norms among Congolese troops, 
a geographic mismatch between the concentration of violence and the concentration of 
MONUSCO resources, and lack of troop commitment at the individual level. A second argument 
addresses problems with the ways in which MONUSCO collaborates with the Congolese state. 
The mission’s collaborative efforts ultimately fail because UN staff prioritizes collaboration with 
Congolese political elites and government institutions at the expense of inclusive consultation 
with Congolese communities. 
 
Internal Limitations: MONUSCO’s Structural Failures 
The evolution of MONUSCO’s peacekeeping mandates parallels an evolution in the 
international peacekeeping conversation, reflecting a transition away from preventing violence 
between states and toward an imperative to protect individual civilians from human rights abuses 
committed by states and non-state actors (Goldstein 2011; ICISS 2001; Mansson 2005). 
MONUSCO’s current mandate, in placing unprecedented emphasis on the protection of civilians, 
represents the current manifestation of these evolving norms.  
In the 1990s, a series of large-scale peacekeeping failures sparked scholarly debate over the 
efficacy of the UN’s approach to conflict resolution. In 2001, the International Commission 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) contested that the problem with international 
peacekeeping lay not with a substandard organizational capacity, but with the UN’s failure to 
adapt to the changing dynamics of international violence in the twenty-first century (Goldstein 
2011; ICISS 2001). The Commission found that each state bore the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its citizens. If a state proved unable or unwilling to carry out this duty, however, it 
became the duty of the international community to provide the state in question with the support 
necessary to protect the rights of individuals within its borders (ICISS 2001).  
This new doctrine, referred to in international relations as the “Responsibility to Protect,” or 
R2P, evolved logically from the UN’s disappointing performance as a global protector of 
civilians (Bratt 1996; ICISS 2001). In a world in which an increasing percentage of civilians 
																																								 																				
1 All interviews were conducted by the author in the North and South Kivu provinces, from June 
to July 2014. 
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suffers atrocities at the hands of their own government and/or non-state actors, ICISS advocates 
for a paradigm shift in peacekeeping (Goldstein 2011). Though R2P has never attained de jure 
status, it is increasingly employed as a de facto standard used to advocate for the authorization of 
new missions and to evaluate existing operations (Oatley 2013).  
Despite growing agreement on the importance of civilian protection, gaps in understanding 
still exist among UN peacekeepers concerning how such norms might be implemented in eastern 
DRC. During my research, interview respondents – both UN staff and Congolese community 
members – expressed frustration at the lack of uniform standards for UN interventions in the 
name of civilian protection. Respondents added that no accountability mechanism requires 
peacekeepers to intervene.  
The absence of uniform understandings of intervention standards and the absence of a 
standard definition of “civilian protection” limit the ability of MONUSCO troops to intervene on 
behalf of civilians. One UN staff member commented on the consequences of a lack of clear 
guidelines by which to measure “civilian protection”: 
When we went out to the field, we would always get updates from peacekeepers on the 
security situation. We would ask what they were doing to protect the civilian population. A 
common answer was, “We do patrols on market days.” They would go in the car and patrol 
the market on specific days. To my understanding, this was not civilian protection. There is 
more to civilian protection than that. (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014) 
Given a mandate to protect civilians, UN soldiers were not accountable for steps they did or 
did not take to do so. My interviews with Congolese community members and UN staff 
evidenced a lack of visible action steps taken to protect Congolese communities from latent 
violence. Whether inaction is attributable to a lack of uniform understanding of what “civilian 
protection” requires, as in the observation above, or to a lack of uniform will, the UN’s failure to 
articulate the parameters of “civilian protection” does Congolese civilians a disservice. A lack of 
evaluative benchmarks also undermines accountability: “Often we see situations in which people 
are fighting near UN troops and the troops do not intervene” (Congolese Community Member, 
interview, June 2014). 
At the organizational level, the mission’s geographic distribution of resources has limited 
MONUSCO’s capacity to effectively protect civilians. Today, many armed groups in the DRC 
operate in rural, sparsely populated areas in the country’s eastern provinces. In contrast, 
MONUSCO places a disproportionately large share of its resources in Kinshasa, the nation’s 
capital, located in the far west of the DRC. Additionally, mission resources and troops remain 
concentrated in urban provincial capitals such as Goma and Bukavu (MONUSCO 2014). 
Conversations with Congolese community members highlight the UN’s failure to prioritize areas 
in the greatest need of support. In the statements below, respondents observed a trend among 
peacekeepers to choose personal comfort over effective civilian protection. 
MONUSCO should go to places where atrocities are actually occurring, rather than 
remaining in town centers. They remain in the center of town because it is easier to access 
water there. (UN Interpreter, interview, July 2014)  
The UN lives in the best places. Compared to where civilians are living, they live much more 
comfortably. They do not seem to care about development or protecting civilians. When they 
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leave, we wonder what we will have to remember them by, because up to this time they have 
done nothing. (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014) 
They do not go to the places where people are fighting. They do not go into the bush. 
(Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014)  
MONUSCO needs a stronger presence in the field, not just in Bukavu or Goma. In order to 
truly protect civilians there definitely needs to be a stronger presence in the field to gather 
information. We can’t simply have the peacekeepers remain at their bases without 
communicating with the civilian population. (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014) 
MONUSCO plays a crucial role in contributing to the discrepancy between the 
overwhelmingly rural location of militia activity and the concentration of troops, which is 
disproportionately urban. Appendix A displays the geographic distribution of armed militias 
currently operating in the DRC. It must be noted that armed group activity remains limited to the 
Congolese provinces of Orientale, North Kivu, and South Kivu, and, to a lesser extent, Katanga. 
Each of these provinces lines the eastern edge of the DRC. Additionally, apart from the Kata-
Katanga armed group in Lubumbashi, in the Katanga province, no armed groups operate in 
provincial capitals and most armed groups reside outside major cities. Even in Katanga, armed 
groups remain concentrated in rural areas and launch only sporadic attacks on major cities like 
Lubumbashi (MONUSCO 2014).  
At the time of this writing, MONUSCO’s DRC headquarters are in Kinshasa, the country’s 
capital city, located about 1,500 miles from the capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu in eastern 
Congo. This is significant given that the country’s eastern provinces have experienced greater 
levels of instability. During the two Congo wars, from 1998 to 2003, Kinshasa itself underwent 
periods of conflict and occupation by foreign militants (Nzongola 2002; Stearns 2011). In the 
years since the war’s formal conclusion, relative peace has returned to Kinshasa. Conflict during 
the 2003–2014 period erupted not only in the nation’s capital, but also in its mineral-rich eastern 
provinces. The inherent shortcomings of MONUSCO’s “home base” location concern more than 
the 1,500 mile distance alone. The country’s east is accessible by way of Kinshasa only through 
air travel, and only on a singular national airline. Travel by road involves many delays due to the 
difficult terrain and unreliable roads, and cross-country automobile excursions may take months 
(Foster and Benitez 2011). In late spring 2014, the mission began a large-scale shift of resources 
from Kinshasa to Congo’s eastern provinces (UN Political Affairs Officer, interview, July 2014). 
This shift represents an overdue development, the tangible consequences of which remain to be 
seen.  
In addition to shortcomings around lack of uniformity in intervention standards and 
geographic organization of resources, assessments by UN staff and Congolese community 
representatives revealed a lack of uniformity in troop skill level and readiness, a systemic lack of 
commitment on the part of UN troops, and a lack of trust between UN troops and Congolese 
civilians: 
I do not think that it is realistic to expect troops to stay for longer than one year. While 
civilian MONUSCO staff may elect to devote their life’s work to Congo, for most military 
peacekeepers the Congo is simply a posting. (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014) 
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How can we expect troops to die for a country that is not their own? (UN Language 
Consultant 2014) 
Regardless of the quality of high-level leadership, the degree of international political will, or 
the financial resources of the mission, the success of MONUSCO depends at least in part on the 
quality of peacekeeping troops. As one interviewee proposed, “The entire purpose of the UN is 
that it is a multinational organization, but this also makes it very difficult to manage” (UN 
Civilian Observer, interview, June 2014). Perceived lack of commitment on the part of individual 
UN troops undermines civilian trust in peacekeeping forces, making it difficult for the UN to 
operate collaboratively and thus more effectively. Additionally, as outlined below, structural 
injustices endemic in UN troop contribution and deployment also taint local perceptions of UN 
credibility. 
 
Country-Level Troop Contributions: Structural Racism in Peacekeeping? 
In considering country-level disparities among peacekeeping troops, concerns also arise 
regarding the potential for structural racism being embedded in the way in which the UN deploys 
peacekeeping forces. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
the nations with the highest military expenditures include, in order of descending expenditure 
size: the United States (US), China, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and Japan. Together, 
these five nations accounted for 1,059 billion USD in military spending (of which the US 
accounted for over 50 percent, at 682 billion), or 60 percent of global military expenditures in 
2012. The US alone bore responsibility for nearly 40 percent of all military expenditures for that 
same year (SIPRI 2013). Of SIPRI’s top 5 military spenders, only China appeared among the UN 
peacekeeping’s top 15 troop contributing countries as of February 2015 (UN Peacekeeping 
2015a). Also in 2015, the US, while first in military spending, ranked 66 in troop contributions, 
with just 119 total military and police personnel serving in peacekeeping operations globally 
(UN Peacekeeping 2015a). As per the UN’s February 2015 report, the top 5 troop contributing 
nations include, in descending order: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Ethiopia, and Rwanda (UN 
Peacekeeping 2015a). Of these 5 nations, only India was listed in SIPRI’s top 15 military 
spenders in 2012 (SIPRI 2013). In observing military expenditure data from SIPRI and troop 
contribution data from the UN, a key pattern emerges: overall, the countries spending the most to 
train and equip their own troops do not proportionately contribute military personnel to 
peacekeeping operations. Using military sending as a crude proxy for troop quality, the statistics 
cited above further corroborate interview responses from MONUSCO personnel, suggesting that 
overall discrepancies in troop quality have proven to be a hindrance to optimal mission 
functioning (UN Civilian Observer, interview, July 2014). Under-resourced and poorly trained 
troops struggle to meet the UN’s more demanding mandate. 
In addition, the numerical differences between country military spending and country troop 
contributions suggest a darker conclusion regarding the structural racism in UN peacekeeping. 
Countries with greater military capacity, on the whole, do not contribute in a meaningful way to 
peacekeeping operations, the vast majority of which are on the African continent. Of the UN’s 
sixteen active peacekeeping operations, just over half – nine out of sixteen – remain 
geographically situated on the African continent. This is twice the number situated in the Middle 
East, the second densest region in the world in terms of peacekeeping, which currently hosts four 
active missions. The European continent hosts only one active UN mission, the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). There are no active missions on the North 
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American continent (UN Peacekeeping 2015b). Taking these figures together with SIPRI data, it 
appears that the UN receives a disproportionately higher share of troop contributions from 
countries with relatively low levels of military spending. The UN then deploys these troops to its 
peacekeeping missions, over 50 percent of which operate on the African continent. In summary, 
a phenomenon arises whereby relatively poorly equipped troops bear the primary responsibility 
for international peacekeeping on the African continent. Examining military expenditures within 
the world’s wealthier, more militarized nations and the corresponding failure of these nations to 
leverage military capacity in service of peacekeeping, the structure of troop contributions and 
deployments is perhaps suggestive of a lack of will rooted in the comparative devaluation of 
African lives. 
 
Collaboration on the Ground: Poorly Placed Priorities 
MONUSCO does in fact expend effort to engage with the host government in the DRC. Thus, 
rather than there being an issue with an absolute lack of collaboration, problems arise with the 
ways in which MONUSCO chooses to prioritize its relationships with stakeholders. The 
mission’s preference for elite-level political consultations reflects the legacy of past UN 
operations in terms of their deference to host governments (Boutros-Ghali 1992; ICISS 2001). 
However, in the DRC, such consultations often serve to systemically exclude Congolese 
communities. While community members do in fact report efforts by MONUSCO to promote 
dialogue, these reports reveal that such consultations categorically lack substance. Community 
members do not witness their recommendations being put into practice by MONUSCO 
personnel. This has led some community members to conclude that the UN’s efforts to 
collaborate with Congolese communities amount to a shallow attempt to feign inclusion. As one 
community member said: “I meet them often at ceremonies. They hold different ceremonies 
where they serve food to people who attend” (Interview, June 2014). The respondent went on to 
state that the meetings referenced lacked any attempt at substantive consultation. 
Relative to political authorities, Congolese community members possess a much more 
comprehensive knowledge of the needs of Congolese civilians and the challenges that they face. 
Thus, to effectively protect civilians in eastern Congo, the UN must shift focus from high-level 
consultations with government officials to more frequent, transparent, and substantive 
collaborations with Congolese communities. Many interviewees expressed frustration with 
MONUSCO’s lack of community consultation: 
When they arrived, they did not consult us or ask our opinion. They simply came and starting 
working without asking what the population here needed. That is why they did not succeed. 
(Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014) 
When MONUSCO came, they signed a contract with the government…the government does 
not know what the Congolese population needs. If they made the contract with us, we could 
better advise them on what needs to be done. (Congolese Community Member, interview, 
June 2014) 
If MONUSCO came to us civilians, we could more accurately advise them on what they need 
to succeed and on what needs to be done. The problem is that they go to the government and 
the government does not know what we need. We recognize that they are not accomplishing 
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their mission but we do not necessarily know why. The government may have an answer to 
this question. (Congolese Community Member, interview, June 2014) 
In the context of a lack of trust between the Congolese electorate and those elected to represent 
their interests, the preference on the part of the UN for high-level political negotiations becomes 
difficult to understand. Collegial relationships between UN personnel and local political officials 
are critical, but such relationships must not come at the expense of an equally collegial 
relationship with Congolese communities. Theoretically, one can argue that, in a society 
sufficiently democratic to presume that elected officials, on average, reliably represent the will of 
that society’s citizens, consistent consultation with those elected officials will go far in 
identifying and responding to the needs of the people. Where the democratic link is weaker, 
however, the relationship between elected officials and the electorate and their needs remains far 
less clear. One UN Team Leader of Interpreters insisted that: “Civil society must not stop until 
their voices are heard. Congolese citizens must continue denouncing atrocities in the presence of 
MONUSCO and must continue to push the Congolese government to fulfill its role in providing 
security. They must push for the new mandate to be implemented in practice; they must push for 
MONUSCO to respect its mandate” (Interview, July 2014). Effective peacekeeping is a 
collaborative effort; for MONUSCO to achieve its mandate, it must meet Congolese civil society 
halfway. 
 
Tourists in Blue Helmets: Shortchanging Congolese Civilians 
Despite minor improvements in mission capacity following the release of UNSC Resolution 
2098, MONUSCO displays a perpetual failure to meet its primary objective: the protection of 
Congolese civilians. This failure arises both from the internal limitations of MONUSCO as well 
as from complexities within the dynamics of collaboration between MONUSCO and the 
Congolese state. While perpetual shortfalls do cast doubt on the credibility of MONUSCO, UN 
peacekeeping, and perhaps even the UN as an organization, Congolese civilians stand to suffer 
the greatest losses if MONUSCO’s capacity to fulfill its objectives continues to fall short of its 
mandate. One Congolese national and former UN employee described the UN’s longstanding 
presence in his country as an “unfulfilled promise”: 
MONUSCO pretends to come and bring peace. What people expect them to do is to come 
and bring peace, but sometimes they have their own agenda. We are really in need of peace. 
In the east of Congo, we have a lot of problems and a lot of challenges. When we were told 
that there would be a mission devoted to all of these problems, we thought that maybe things 
would change. What we see in the field and what people are expecting are two very different 
things. (UN Language Consultant, interview, June 2014)  
This language consultant’s statement reflects a pervasive opinion among Congolese civilians that 
the UN fails to deliver on its promises. More alarmingly, the consultant suggests a discrepancy 
between MONUSCO’s explicit objectives and the mission’s underlying agenda.  
The consultant’s claims do not lack historical precedent, particularly in the Congolese case. 
In Toward an African Revolution, Frantz Fanon writes, “It is not true to say that the UN fails 
because the cases are difficult. In reality the UN is a legal card used by the imperialist interests 
when the card of brute force has failed” (1969, 195). Fanon here references the complicity of 
ONUC in Belgium’s neo-colonial occupation of Katanga province and other parts of the Congo 
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in the 1960s. In Lumumba Speaks (1961) and The Assassination of Lumumba (2001), Patrice 
Lumumba and Ludo De Witte, respectively, additionally implicate the UN as a key player in the 
US–Belgian plot to eliminate Congo’s first prime minister and inspire the rise of General 
Mobutu. The ONUC mission ostensibly operated in an effort to restore law and order following a 
succession of post-independence crises in July 1960: the Congolese National Army (Armée 
Nationale Congolaise, or ANC) mutiny, the secession of Katanga province under Moise 
Tshombe, and the subsequent occupation of the region by Belgian troops. In his capacity as 
Prime Minister, Lumumba initially requested UN intervention in response to Belgium’s violation 
of Congolese sovereignty (Lumumba 1961). The mission quickly deviated from its ostensibly 
neutral role, prolonging Belgian occupation and undermining Lumumba’s political authority (De 
Witte 2001; Lumumba 1961). 
While it is perhaps unfair to superimpose the sins of ONUC on its twenty-first century 
successor, MONUSCO, the criticisms of Fanon, De Witte, and Lumumba remain worthy of 
careful consideration, particularly given contemporary doubts regarding the UN’s motives in the 
Congo (Congolese community members, interview, June 2014; Nzongola 2012). The fact 
remains that the interests of powerful, wealthy countries prevail at the United Nations. For its 
part, the United States funds nearly 30 percent of the total UN peacekeeping budget (Power 
2015), while three out of the five permanent seats on the UNSC belong to Western governments 
(UNSC 2015). In this climate of disproportionate influence, scrutiny must be applied to the 
motives behind UN peacekeeping decisions. 
Whether due to a Western-dominated sub-agenda or, more benignly, to practical mission 
shortcomings, the fact remains that MONUSCO represents a perpetual unfulfilled promise to 
many Congolese civilians. At best, the mission’s well-meaning initiatives fall short of tangibly 
benefitting the Congolese people. At worst, MONUSCO represents a fifteen-year, billion-dollar 
façade, a mockery of peace where Congolese civilians remain the butt of a cruel joke. As one 
Congolese community member reported: “We can tell you about their mandate because we hear 
what they tell us in the different meetings we attend. But if you ask other civilians who do not 
attend these meetings, they will tell you that MONUSCO troops are like tourists. They just come 
to visit and to steal riches from Congo. They are ‘working’ but they are not doing anything” 
(Interview, June 2014). 
While the comparison of UN peacekeepers to tourists might exaggerate the nature of 
MONUSCO’s inadequacy, the reflection by this community member channels years of 
frustration on the part of Congolese civilians in response to the unfulfilled promise of peace. 
Since the nearly one and a half years since MONUSCO’s 2013 mandate granted the mission 
increased power and authority to protect civilians in eastern DRC, the slow rate of progress 
suggests that the mission is on track to yet another failed promise. If the international community 
is to make good on its promise to work with the DRC toward sustainable peace, MONUSCO 
cannot afford to neglect its internal shortcomings, nor can it fail to reform its strategy for 
working collaboratively with Congolese institutions. 
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Appendix A. Map Showing Armed Group Presence in the DRC 
 
Source: MONUSCO. 2015. La MONUSCO en un Clin d’œil. [MONUSCO at a Glance]. (April). 
https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2015-04-16_global_factsheet_fre.pdf. 
 
Global Africana Review 
Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 2017 
	24 
 
Haitian Immigrants in Rural Maryland: Experiences of Life and Health 
Emily C. Sheffield 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite expanding populations of immigrants in new receiving communities in the United States, 
many resources aimed at serving these communities remain underdeveloped and difficult to 
access. Particularly burdensome for immigrants in rural Maryland are barriers to health care 
access, as these often overlap with barriers of language and education as well as general attitudes 
of racism toward and marginalization of Haitian immigrants. In this paper, I employ a qualitative 
analysis of interview transcripts to identify prominent themes surrounding Haitian individuals’ 
life experiences on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. Interviews were completed by a research 
team as part of an ongoing ethnography that aims to understand more broadly the experiences of 
immigrant groups in the area. 
Keywords: Haitian immigrants, immigrant health, rural immigration, health care access, United 
States 
 
 
Despite expanding populations of immigrants in new receiving communities in the United States, 
many resources aimed at serving these communities remain largely underdeveloped and difficult 
to access (Sangaramoorthy and Guevara, 2016). Often overlapping with language barriers and 
obstacles that impact individuals’ access to educational services, barriers to health care access 
are particularly burdensome for immigrants in rural Maryland and can be strong indicators of 
population vulnerability. For this research, I employed a qualitative analysis of interview 
transcripts to identify prominent themes surrounding Haitian individuals’ life experiences on the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland. The participants interviewed raised concerns regarding a lack of 
health insurance coverage, difficulties covering health expenses, language and education 
barriers, and negative treatment by health providers and by work supervisors; this research 
appears to indicate that all of these areas significantly impact the life experiences of these 
particular Haitian immigrants. My analysis also indicates that Haitian immigrants living in this 
region face barriers to receiving quality health care because of general attitudes of racism toward 
and the resultant marginalization of Haitians living in the United States. Following a discussion 
of methodology and a brief history of Haiti, I will examine some of the areas of concern raised 
by the research participants and discuss their impacts on the everyday life experiences of 
Haitians on the Eastern Shore. 
My analysis was completed as part of an ongoing ethnography, conducted by Dr. Thurka 
Sangaramoorthy and Emilia Guevara of the University of Maryland at College Park. This project 
is aimed at developing a comprehensive understanding of the experiences of multiple immigrant 
groups on the Eastern Shore of Maryland; additional data concerning the lives of Haitian 
immigrants and those of other nationalities in rural areas of Maryland are being collected by 
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these researchers to address broader areas of interest. I transcribed and manually coded six 
participant interviews and read the transcripts of and coded four other interviews, all of which I 
examined for my analysis. While I did not personally conduct any of the interviews, I was 
allowed access to the data as a research assistant through a research initiative program at the 
University of Maryland in the summer of 2016. Dr. Sangaramoorthy and Emilia Guevara 
conducted the interviews in the summers of 2014 and 2015, along with the assistance of a 
translator. 
Haitians tend to experience racism, exclusion, and marginalization as an immigrant group 
largely because of Haiti’s current geopolitical situation and the tumultuous history of its peoples. 
Today, Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western hemisphere and one of the poorest in 
the world, leaving individuals from its borders to bear the burden of those characterizations 
(World Bank, 2016). Its intimate connection with the Transatlantic Slave Trade as a slave colony 
of France, as well as the Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804, which positively led to its 
independence from France, but nevertheless resulted in political and economic upheaval 
following its remarkable efforts to escape European colonialism, have also impacted the way the 
nation of Haiti is viewed by the global community. In addition, the numerous natural disasters 
that have severely impacted the country in recent years, such as the 7.0 magnitude earthquake 
that struck the island in January of 2010, have necessitated migration and displacement to other 
areas in order to keep its people safe and to rebuild. Many of the Haitian immigrants interviewed 
for this study immigrated to the Eastern Shore of Maryland either as a direct result of the 
earthquake or following their family members who had done so for that reason, signifying its 
importance to Haitian immigration to the United States. 
Haiti was added to the list of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) countries following the 2010 
earthquake, a disaster that claimed somewhere between 46,000 and 316,000 lives and initially 
displaced over one million people (Nwosu and Batalova, 2014). Citizens of TPS countries are 
granted temporary relief from deportation and allowed to work without legal identification in the 
United States, meaning that Haitian immigrants who wanted to come to the United States were 
permitted to do so with only a work visa and not the legal documentation required of other 
immigrants. One of the main reasons that immigrant populations have been growing rapidly in 
rural areas in particular, such as the Eastern Shore, is the availability of jobs that are termed low-
skilled employment opportunities (Sangaramorthy and Guevara, 2016). These jobs generally 
require only limited proficiency in the English language, a factor that can be attractive to 
immigrants who do not speak or prefer not to speak English, regardless of their country of origin. 
A majority of the immigrants interviewed for this research had come to the United States as a 
result of this protected status, and had taken the opportunity to find low-skilled labor jobs and 
continue their education at local colleges, in order to learn English and ideally improve their 
employment situation beyond an hourly-wage job with few benefits. For example, the Haitian 
immigrants interviewed as part of this research project had all either previously worked in or 
currently worked in chicken processing plants.  
One of the more significant impacts on rural areas in which large numbers of immigrants 
settle is that on health care systems, as rapid immigration and subsequent surges in population 
growth can put a strain on the existent systems. These strains specifically tend to cause shortages 
of health care providers, high and increasing rates of patients who do not have health insurance, 
and limited resources with which to provide care for those who seek services (Ricketts, 2000). 
Many individuals mentioned struggles with being able to afford health insurance and the costs of 
health care with and without insurance, as well as the difficulties they experienced in being able 
Sheffield Haitian Immigrants in Rural Maryland 
 
	26 
to schedule appointments with doctors within a fair window of time, and a general lack of 
translation resources for non-English speaking immigrants. 
Being mostly low-skilled laborers, these immigrants were receiving hourly wages that were 
not sufficient to provide them with funds enough to pay for health insurance or health care costs 
in addition to the more immediate financial needs of rent, groceries, and education fees for their 
children. Many participants were also dealing with the financial strain of saving money to send 
to family members still living in Haiti who were either not able or willing to immigrate 
elsewhere. One participant, during an interview, said: 
Yeah, it’s for the rest of it… The rest is a lot of money still and I don’t see how I could pay 
it. Insurance doesn’t pay as much as they say. While I was in the hospital, I had Perdue’s 
insurance, but it got cut. So I went through Obama’s insurance – I pay $135.02 every month. 
Further along in the interview, it was explained that this had happened because the participant 
had been fired for taking time off of work to go to the doctor. This is a common obstacle for 
individuals working in low-skilled labor jobs in the United States because employers see their 
workers as readily replaceable with other immigrants in need of work. As most of these 
immigrants were also in the country as a result of being granted TPS, many of them did not have 
the legal documentation required to obtain health insurance, even if they could afford it. One 
interview participant said of a friend, who was also a member of the Haitian community in the 
region: 
When she was without papers, she would go to the hospital and sometimes they would care 
for her, but they would not give her all the care that she would need. There are some cares 
they wouldn’t give her. 
Limitations of the strained healthcare system in the region such as these often overlap with 
feelings of racism and discrimination toward Haitian patients who seek care without insurance 
and citizenship documentation. Individuals such as this within the community reported feeling 
that they were not likely to receive the same quality of care as a US citizen, as a Haitian 
immigrant with permanent citizenship status or insurance, or even as an English-speaker.  
For Haitian immigrants, language barriers take on a whole new level of difficulty compared 
to many other immigrant groups in the United States. Particularly for health care services, 
Haitian Creole interpreters are very difficult to find; for example, in the nine counties that 
comprise the region of the Eastern Shore, there is one known Haitian Creole interpreter. There 
are some telephone services available for usage during a visit to a physician, but most interview 
participants admitted that the phone lines are often busy, and that when they do work, it is often 
hard to communicate over the phone. As one interpreter said: 
for the Spanish speakers, there will be somebody on site working, so they can go get 
someone and get help in the language. But it’s not like that for the Haitian community, so 
pretty much they will have somebody with them who can help them [speak English]. 
This represents one example of a language barrier that is largely different from that impacting 
immigrants belonging to Spanish-speaking communities. Language barriers are difficult to 
overcome in any situation, but they provide more of an obstacle when there is less opportunity 
for translation. Communication becomes especially important during the relaying of physical 
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symptoms, which many patients are unable to do accurately due to this particular restriction. In 
addition, interview participants described how difficult it can be to understand prescriptions upon 
leaving the physician’s office. In many cases, the prescription labels, including dosage 
instructions and warnings, are simply typed into and then printed from a computer translator. 
This means that patients are not always provided with the most understandable instructions for 
taking their medications, which can have drastic consequences. For example, one interview 
participant described a mutual friend’s experience of not understanding how many pills of a 
medicine to take or how frequently to take them, due to a lack of clarity in the instructions on the 
bottle label. 
Poor treatment by health providers is another factor that contributes to the participants’ 
experiences and conceptualizations of health in the region as immigrants. Partially as a result of 
the increased demand on existent health care systems in rural areas, which receive an influx of 
patients over a short period of time, health care providers often pay less attention to their patients 
than many patients feel is necessary to understand the problem. For instance, one woman who 
was interviewed told her story of a traumatic experience of having a late-term miscarriage. She 
said that the doctor was so rushed that he offered no condolence and no explanation, merely 
stating that she was no longer carrying a living fetus and that this was the reason for all of her 
described symptoms. Following this experience, the woman was understandably quite hesitant 
about returning to a health care provider, as she was wary of receiving similar treatment. One 
interview participant described being a patient as being treated “like a business,” as doctors are 
not often as compassionate as they should be in situations that require comforting the patient or 
connecting emotionally. This lack of a connection with patients results in part from the health 
care providers being overworked, as doctors do not necessarily have the time to commit to each 
individual patient with such an increase in the population they are serving. 
Additionally, the perception of many interviewees was that health care providers can and 
often do act toward their patients in ways that highlight the racism and marginalization that 
affects the Haitian community on the Eastern Shore. Many doctors seem to be, as reported in 
several accounts, more likely to spend less time with patients who do not speak English or those 
who do not have the most capable of translators accompanying them. About half of the interview 
participants said that they had been recipients of racist remarks either toward Haitians 
specifically or about people of color generally, and many said that they had been discriminated 
against by health clinics in the area that were specifically set up to help Latinx immigrants. 
As mentioned earlier, all of the interview participants had either previously or currently 
worked for chicken processing plants. These types of jobs are classified as low-skilled labor. 
Given that the rural areas surrounding these plants are those that are also receiving the largest 
influxes of immigrant populations, it is understandable that there are many people vying for 
these job opportunities. More than one participant described a racial hierarchy within the system, 
with white people, particularly men, usually serving as the ultimate boss, and black Americans 
serving as what are termed “bosses,” who oversee and have more direct interactions with the 
daily laborers, most of whom are of Haitian or Hispanic nationality. As there is a large pool of 
job candidates from which to choose, with everyone trying to find some form of work following 
their immigration to the United States, employers often have the ability to fire individuals as they 
please – if they have to take time off of work to care for children, have to use sick time, or have 
to use the lavatory during their shift, among other reasons, many immigrants can lose their jobs 
at these plants. 
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The view of immigrant workers by their superiors as easily replaceable and the refusal to 
give them time for bathroom breaks or doctor visits in effect dehumanizes them, a sentiment 
clearly expressed by one of the interview participants: 
They take people for their robots, and we are human. We cannot do the same thing like a 
machine. It’s really painful, physically. And they consider it like it’s slaves, because they 
need your blood. They don’t allow you to do whatever you want when you need it. Like I 
need to go to the bathroom – when you need to go they don’t want you to go. 
Immigrant workers may also be fired for not working fast enough, as their overseers sometimes 
expect the workers to complete quotas “like a machine,” faster than what is reasonable to expect 
for human labor. The Haitian workers interviewed reported poor treatment by almost all other 
racial groups who work in these plants, particularly by both white and black Americans and by 
English speakers. The interview participants who raised these concerns said that the poor 
treatment became less noticeable when they were able to communicate with their supervisors and 
with other workers in English, although remarks were still made about their accent. Interview 
participants reported feeling a total relief from this type of racist treatment only when they were 
among others within the Haitian community or with their respective families. 
Barriers to education services can also create many difficulties for immigrants trying to build 
a life in the United States, although this difficulty can be applied to many immigrant groups in 
general. Particularly because many immigrants have to work low-skilled labor jobs for at least 
their first few years in the country, it is difficult to find the time required to attend classes or 
study. Many interview participants mentioned that they could not take the time off of work to go 
to school, largely because of the aforementioned poor treatment by employers in the plants. A 
few described having to alternate work schedules with their spouse or partner – one partner 
would work the day shift, while the other stayed home to care for children or parents, and when 
the former returned from work, they would switch responsibilities and the other would work the 
night shift. This system, mentioned by more than one interview participant, was effective in 
ensuring that the household was making the maximum profit between the two adults, by bringing 
in two wages and avoiding childcare expenses. Though the increase in earning potential was 
beneficial, interview participants expressed disappointment that this left little time for schooling, 
meaning that they would continue to struggle with learning English and would likely not have as 
many future job prospects beyond those of the low-skilled labor type. 
Through an analysis of the interviews, it became increasingly clear that the concerns raised 
most frequently regarding a lack of health insurance coverage, the high cost of health expenses, 
language barriers, poor treatment by health providers, poor treatment by employers in low-
skilled labor occupations, and barriers to education services all impact Haitian immigrants’ life 
experiences on the Eastern Shore. The intersections and overlaps of these barriers create 
especially troublesome obstacles for Haitian immigrants working in the region, and particularly 
for those employed in low-skilled labor opportunities. These overlaps can create affordability 
barriers to economic security and advancement that can prevail for years, if an immigrant is 
unable to acquire a job requiring English proficiency that could ultimately lead to higher wage-
earning potential. Language barriers complicate access to health care because of the difficulty in 
communicating with health providers without a translator present and in reading prescriptions. A 
lack of access to education services often exacerbates those existent language barriers, if 
immigrants are unable to attend school, creating another component of financial stress for 
immigrant households through the overlap with barriers to economic advancement. Poor 
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treatment by health providers often discourages Haitian immigrants from seeking necessary 
health care, and poor treatment by employers often forces workers to choose between seeking 
health treatment and working to avoid termination. 
These individual barriers can become increasingly difficult to navigate when combined with 
attitudes of racial discrimination and “otherness” that are often applied to Haitian community 
members, as well as to immigrants and people of color in general. Discrimination toward these 
immigrants can stem from a multitude of factors: skin color, occupation, health insurance status, 
citizenship status, a perceived or actual lack of English proficiency, and a Creole accent, among 
countless other factors. The intersection of these barriers with racism and marginalization 
strongly affects the lives of Haitian immigrants, including their personal experiences with health 
care. The kinds of experiences that generated the concerns of those interviewed suggest broader 
issues that increase the vulnerability of Haitian populations in the United States, of which 
conceptions of health and health care access can be used as indicators. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
A wave of populism is certainly sweeping the world yet again. In Africa, the ugliest face of 
violent nationalism can be observed in South Africa, where regular spikes of xenophobia are an 
affront to the pan Africanist project that leaders on the continent have been trying to actualize for 
decades. This paper explores socio-economic, political, psychological, and cultural dimensions 
of the othering of the non-South African black, which are ultimately rooted in the fear of 
experiencing increased scarcity in an already economically infertile field for the low class, 
unemployed citizen. The paper attempts to propose a way forward that includes strengthening 
individual states on the continent and specifically addressing fear based behaviors. 
Keywords: xenophobia, populism, pan Africanism, entrepreneurship, migration 
 
 
Introduction 
The nation state is a relatively recent, yet incredibly powerful, concept. The notion that identity, 
belonging, and obligation begin and end at certain physical boundaries is peculiar when we take 
into consideration the perpetual movement of peoples over time. The places in which groups and 
individuals found themselves when certain borders were erected did not necessarily have any 
significant connection to their identity in the future, whether social, political, or economical. As 
much as nation states can serve as useful units of both organization and measurement for both 
human and economic development, they can also be tools for constructing divisive differences 
where they do not need to exist (Morse and Fraser 2005, 629). This is especially true in the 
context of Africa, where national borders drawn up at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 were 
not a function of the historical and practical groupings of people, but of the colonial agenda. 
Divvying up the continent also meant isolating chunks of the continent from each other in what 
is commonly termed a divide-and-conquer tactic. The pan Africanist movement at its core works 
to undo this sense of division. Instead, the goal of the movement is to harness the intellectual, 
social, political, and, eventually, economic strength that arises from unity (Hill 2015, 136). 
It is alarming that several nations continue to embrace divisive nationalism, populism, and a 
disdain for foreign nationals. The newly inaugurated Trump administration of the United States, 
that of Theresa May in the United Kingdom, and the possibility of a Marie Le Pen presidency in 
France are prominent examples. South Africa has also been guilty of holding nationalist and 
xenophobic sentiment for similar reasons, including a disenchantment with governments’ over-
promised allure of prosperity, complemented by the convenient scapegoating of foreign nationals 
for putting a so-called extra strain on national social and economic infrastructure. On multiple 
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levels, Africans are already victims of systematic discrimination worldwide. Prime examples 
come out of the neoliberal economic system, built on exploitative colonial foundations, which 
perpetuates African dependency and poverty; the restriction of the movement of African peoples; 
and the inescapable racism used to justify the launch of the transatlantic slave trade as the basis 
of capitalism. It is imperative, then, that Africans refrain from participating in their own 
disadvantaging. 
In this paper, I look at how South African newspapers covered xenophobic violence during 
major outbursts between 2008 and 2016. Noteworthy spikes in violence can be observed in 2008, 
2011, and 2015. An especially relevant primary source is volume 16 of the Chimurenga Chronic. 
The Chronic is an annual publication that, in 2011, published a “time travel” edition set in the 
week of May 18th to 24th, during the height of the 2008 attacks, in order to serve as “a time-
machine – which travels backwards and forwards, to place these events within a broader context” 
(Chimurenga Chronic 2011, 1). In this important edition, journalists conducted interviews with 
eyewitnesses neglected by police, in order to reconstruct and report the reality that the police 
force was complicit in whitewashing. South African hostility toward other black Africans 
suggests inauspicious implications for the future of the pan Africanist project. This is because 
xenophobia stems from an unwillingness to engage with the rest of the continent culturally, 
socially, and politically. This is counterproductive as such engagement is at the core of pan 
Africanism. The othering of the non-South African black is seen even at the highest levels of 
government, with President Jacob Zuma offhandedly remarking during a news conference on 
road toll fees, for example: “We can’t think like Africans in Africa generally. This is 
Johannesburg. It is not some national road in Malawi” (Aljazeera 2013). His disparaging 
comments explicitly reflect a prevalent South African sense of superiority and disdain that 
elevates South Africa above the rest of the continent. Social consciousness is also embedded 
with exclusive language that reflects the sentiment that Africa is a foreign space. South African 
slang contains derogatory terms for migrants that are country specific for most nationalities – 
“Koolie” for Indian, “Paki” for Pakistani, and “M’china” for Chinese, for example – but one 
term is used for all black, non-South African Africans: kwerekwere. Used to mock this group, 
this word was originally derived from the languages spoken by this group that, according to 
South Africans, were “unintelligible” (Warner and Finchilescu 2003, 38). The use of one 
singular word for other Africans represents the perception that the rest of the continent is a 
monolith devoid of idiosyncrasy and inherent value, and therefore not worthy of being learned 
about and engaged with. Overall, lack of interest in and constructive engagement with the rest of 
the continent, including the conditions that migrants are coming from, facilitates fallacious 
reasoning surrounding what cohabitation can mean for all. Unfortunately, this gives rise to 
hostility at best, and hate-fuelled violence at worst. 
 
The History of South Africa as an African Melting Pot 
Labor migrations have led to a diverse urban population in South Africa. The gold and diamond 
rushes of the nineteenth century, for example, necessitated a large influx of laborers from all 
over Africa to capitalize on the mineral finds that would become the cornerstone of the South 
African economy. As well as from other parts of the country, people flocked from Mozambique, 
Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Namibia as unskilled laborers. When mining moved from 
being primarily open cast to underground, a more specialized and skilled labor force was 
required; thus, mine owners moved men more permanently to mine sites by building them semi-
permanent, dorm-style dwellings called hostels (Wentzel and Tlabela 2006, 74). This separated 
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families and more concretely changed the makeup of the South African working class. During 
the period of 1890 to 1899, when Johannesburg’s gold industry was rapidly expanding, the 
migrant population at these mines grew from approximately 14,000 to 97,000 (Skinner 2015, 
73). 
Particularly within the Southern African Development Community, South Africa had liberal 
agreements when it came to the free movement of people for work. Still, “one of the main 
characteristics of the migrant labour system was that foreign workers had traditionally been 
denied permanent rights to work or take up residence in South Africa, regardless of the overall 
length of their employment under succeeding contracts, or their established familial connections 
or social ties” (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 76). Black South African citizens themselves 
suffered from being cast as the ‘other’ in the country of their birth through the white settler 
regime’s influx controls and pass laws that were put in place to keep them and their families out 
of urban areas, while still exploiting their cheap labor (which they were then taxed on without 
representation). Also, the social and economic costs a state usually has to bear to sustain a 
productive workforce were outsourced, in that migrants could not stay and utilize public goods in 
their areas of work (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 77). 
Another major source of pre-1994 migration was African refugees fleeing war, repressive 
regimes, and/or postcolonial power struggles. People from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Angola, and Mozambique are some examples. The Mozambican civil war coincided with 
drought and famine in the country, causing many to flee to South Africa amongst other places 
(Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 81). Even then, a lack of solidarity with the black non-
African was apparent at the state level as Mozambican refugees were refused recognition, in 
some cases, by denying them assistance. This was until 1996, when the government signed and 
ratified the United Nations Convention on Refugees and the Organization of African Unity 
Convention regarding the protection and treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. This was a 
step in the right direction, as it required the state to adhere to international guidelines on 
accepting and providing for those eligible for asylum-seeker and refugee status (Handmaker, de 
la Hunt, and Klaaren 2008, 1). 
 
The Catch-22 of the Move to South Africa 
Northcote and Dodson state that, in the contemporary era, while some Africans from outside of 
South Africa find employment in the formal sector, most earn their livelihoods from insecure, 
informal work as casual laborers (2015, 146). When other Africans move to South Africa to 
work, the informal sector is easier to break into than the formal one. Starting or working in a 
small, unregistered business allows one to bypass legal regulations and run on low launch and 
operational costs. Moreover, success is a function of how much initiative and street smarts 
migrants display, rather than of the cooperation of the Departments of Labour or Home Affairs, 
which are responsible for work permits, asylum-seeker status, and refugee visas. Non-skilled 
migrants, or those who cannot enter the formal sector, can find work on construction sites, as 
domestic workers, or as traders or artisans who sell goods and services, either as itinerate 
hawkers or through small businesses called spaza shops. Spaza shops are small convenience 
stores located in low income communities that sell necessary household items in affordable 
quantities. For example, if a family cannot afford to buy eggs, milk, and bread in the full-sized 
quantities available at the supermarket, they can buy a single egg, one liter of milk, and a half 
loaf of bread to fulfill their daily needs while they continue to attempt to make ends meet. 
Perceived disparities in the success of migrant owner versus South African-owned spaza shops 
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manifest in xenophobic behaviors within the already prevalent crime culture of South Africa, in 
the sense that attacks on migrant shop owners can be more violent and frequent. In 2013, 
Northcote and Dodson interviewed a series of spaza shop owners. One Somali interviewee 
commented: “As for safety, it is very bad in South Africa for refugees, especially for Somalians. 
If they see [a] Somalian, they think they’ve got money. But money is very difficult – if you sell 
sweets and what-what, and small groceries, if you sell that stuff, maybe, plus minus, you can get 
more than R2,000 or R3,000 per month… The people, they see this money and they think that 
you’ve got a lot of money” (Northcote and Dodson 2015, 159). Refugees and registered asylum 
seekers are legally permitted to work in the formal sector, but anti-migrant sentiment, 
exacerbated by the prevalence of fake documents, can act as an invisible barrier to entry (Landau 
and Segatti 2009, 54). Migrants also often perform casual labor, which is defined as “informal 
work that is performed for an employer without the rights associated with formal employment, 
such as sick leave, paid leave, or a formal contract” (Devey et al. 2006, as quoted in Northcote 
and Dodson 2015, 147). Census data reflects that unemployment rates are lower in African 
migrant communities in South Africa than they are amongst South Africans. Compared to 31 
percent of South Africans, 18 percent of Zimbabweans, 24 percent of Mozambicans, and 30 
percent of Basotho who live in the country are unemployed (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 
4). Even in this informal sector, the communities in which migrants operate, as well as the South 
African government itself in some regards, propagate the stereotypes of non-South Africans as 
unworthy of the space, market share, and commercial success the country affords them. These 
stereotypical beliefs fall into three broad categories: (1) since many migrant businesses operate 
parallel to legal and regulatory frameworks, they act as parasites on the economy without 
formally contributing to it in the form of taxes; (2) migrants are taking jobs away from South 
Africans, a widespread populist belief observed also in the United States against Mexicans and 
South Americans, as well as in the United Kingdom, where “Put Britain First” is seen on 
Brexiteer merchandise and publications; and (3) migrant business practices and owners are more 
often than not nefarious. Stereotypes include the Nigerian drug dealer and brothel owner, the 
stingy and entitled Pakistani shop owner, and the stealing Zimbabwean domestic worker (Crush, 
Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 3). Public consciousness surrounding South Africans is 
summarized as follows by Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner: 
A central premise of the hostility towards “foreigners” in South Africa is that they “steal” 
jobs from South Africans. A survey in 2010 found that 60 per cent of South Africans believe 
that migrants take jobs and only 27 per cent that they create them. Furthermore, nearly 60 per 
cent felt that reasons for the xenophobic violence of 2008 included that migrants take jobs 
from South Africans and that they do not belong in the country. At the same time, only 16 
per cent of South Africans claimed that they had personally been denied a job because it was 
given to a foreign national. (2015, 6) 
On the other hand, studies on the casual labor market in Cape Town in 2012 found that, when 
picking up day laborers who were advertising their trades (such as painters or carpenters) on the 
roadside, people tended to favor foreign nationals based on their higher English proficiency and 
the mentality that they tend to work harder (Northcote and Dodson 2015, 147). 
Fatoki conducted a case study attempting to measure if a difference existed between the 
entrepreneurial tendencies of migrant informal business owners and those of South Africans. The 
study found that migrant entrepreneurial practices are characterized as exhibiting “competitive 
intelligence,” a quality that includes, for example: scoping out the prices at which goods and 
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services are being traded by local competitors; being willing to offer a greater range of products 
(stocked from South Africa and their home countries); keeping their stores open for longer hours; 
and reducing operational costs by working with other migrant business owners to buy 
collectively and harvest the benefits of bulk prices or the divided cost of transportation (Fatoki 
2013, 90–92). All of this enables migrant-owned businesses to undercut prices advertised by 
South African informal traders and secure a greater proportion of customers; this is negatively 
interpreted by local traders and their families and communities as “stealing” market share. 
The hostile attitudes these biases foster come not only from ordinary citizens who, ironically, 
buy and use goods and services offered to them by the migrant community because of the on-
average lower prices, the cause of which will be addressed shortly, but also from South African 
police officials who exhibit and license xenophobia on the very streets where they are paid to 
maintain order. An article in the Chimurenga Chronic titled “The Warm Up” that explored the 
beginnings of the 2008 spike, quotes a policeman inciting mob action by saying, “Sort these 
people out, we also don’t want them here” to an already riled up mob in Atteridgeville (Sosibo 
2011, 2). An example of members of the police tainting the integrity of the force is 2014’s 
“Operation Hardstick,” during which over six hundred small, informal businesses owned by 
foreign Africans, some of whom were refugees, were fined, expelled from their operating sites, 
and had their owners detained and/or verbally abused by Limpopo province police. The Supreme 
Court ultimately ruled the operation was highly discriminatory and unconstitutional, seeing as 
what was supposed to be a blanket informal sector regulating operation was selectively enforced 
to only target foreign Africans. An affidavit presented in the case of the Somali Association of 
South Africa and Others versus the Limpopo Department of Economic Development, 
Environment and Tourism stated that the South African police force’s behavior, “tell[s] a story of 
the most naked form of xenophobic discrimination and of the utter desperation experienced by 
the victims of that discrimination” (SAFLII 2014). The notion of desperation being exploited in 
this instance is particularly significant, as one could deduce that high levels of desperation 
caused by unemployment and coupled with a lack of service delivery within the South African 
population itself is a major cause of xenophobia. The irony of the solidarity that should come 
from experiencing the same struggle instead manifesting as fierce, violent competitiveness is 
tragic and favors those with the home ground advantage. A repeat incident was Johannesburg 
Metro Police’s Operation Clean Sweep in 2013, which affected between five thousand and six 
thousand traders (Nxumalo and Tolsi 2013). In an interview with Ungulani Ba Ka Khosa, a 
celebrated Mozambican novelist, a fellow Mozambican reflected on how disappointed he was to 
learn during the 2008 attacks that he was mistaken about how well he had assimilated into South 
Africa, a place he had called home for ten years. The interviewed Mozambican remarked: 
I assumed myself to be Matsolo [a Sotho sounding South Africanization of his Mozambican 
last name, Matola]… But they, in truth, never did accept me. When caught by the whirlwind 
of hate, all they saw [were] foreigners. To all of those, they directed the hatred they felt for 
their own miserable lives. It was tough. And even tougher was when we saw the images of 
Ernesto Nhamuave burning alive. They wrote “Burning Man”, “Burning Nation”. But what 
was burning away wasn’t only South Africa, but also the world; the world that burns with 
misery and hate. (Ba Ka Khosa 2013) 
“Burning Man” refers to the unequivocal low point of the 2008 violence, when Ernesto Alfabeto 
Nhamuave, a Mozambican national, was burned alive in front of a giant mob in Ramaphosa, an 
informal settlement east of Johannesburg. 
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It is not difficult to understand why non-South African blacks live in a state of fear that ebbs 
and flows according to the changing, yet somewhat regular, currents of violent xenophobic flare-
ups that go unaddressed. Rather than tackling roots as well as symptoms, periods of high 
violence and tension are simply waited out until they subside, leaving all demographics 
uncomfortable and nursing subdued resentment until the next violent eruption. Fear amongst the 
migrant community manifests across the domestic, social, and professional spheres. Somali shop 
owners have reported being afraid to invest in immovable property out of fear that they will have 
to flee and abandon it in the foreseeable future. They also sell their goods from behind thick, 
clear plastic windows with burglar bars and small windows through which only hands holding 
groceries and money can fit, in order to make it as difficult as possible for outsiders to enter the 
small, contained stall to vandalize and loot or hurt the owner. South African police officials are 
also guilty of looting and extortion (Battersby and Peyton 2014, 161). Bribes are elicited by 
police and given by shop owners to secure some level of protection or to ensure simply being left 
alone. The transnational movements of migrant informal entrepreneurs mean that this group is 
particularly vulnerable to this level of corruption since there are more formal, systematized 
checkpoints that facilitate police demanding payments. Interviews with those who frequently 
move across borders have revealed that, as of January 2016, such payments are an average of 
ZAR 2,000 and ZAR 5,000 ($147.20 and $368.01 USD, respectively). That is a sizeable chunk 
of capital that could go toward stock or operational costs being lost, for example, at the 
Beitbridge border post with Zimbabwe, where “84 per cent of traders had goods valued between 
ZAR1,000 and ZAR5,000” (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner, 2015, 12). Another example of 
police corruption involves Moses Mhlangu, a Mozambican artisan who had lived in South Africa 
for twenty-seven years and been a citizen for five years by 2008. Mhlangu reported to the 
Chimurenga newspaper, while on the run from his home in Atteridgeville, that a policeman had 
warned him of imminent violence, saying that, for a fee, Mhlangu could buy private police 
protection for himself and his business. Although Mhlangu did not pay this bribe, he reported 
that even those who did pay had their spaza shop vandalized (Sosibo 2011, 3). 
Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner (2015) also laud this transnational trade as a form of low-level 
globalization, facilitated through small amounts of capital and informal transactions carried out 
in businesses that survive by bootstrapping, since many of them are rendered ineligible for 
business or personal loans from formal South African financial institutions. 
 
Tiers of Exclusion 
As mentioned, there are levels to xenophobic exclusion. Crush and Ramachandaran (2015, 28) 
outline four particular avenues of exclusion as: (1) the protectionist position of the South African 
state when it comes to regulating small to medium enterprises, including informal businesses, 
that disadvantages and restricts migrant business activity; (2) the bribe seeking of police 
officials, who solicit payment from migrant entrepreneurs or workers in exchange for protection 
from xenophobically motivated raids or document checks or violence from South Africans in 
their community; (3) migrant business owners being intimidated or physically scared out of 
certain areas to make space for natives; and (4) grassroots discrimination on individual and 
community levels. Migrants and their businesses are attacked violently, with many individuals 
being scared into moving once again or even killed. Table 1, below, shows recorded xenophobic 
incidents of collective violence. There is a trend of overall increase in violent incidences, with an 
anomalous spike in 2010 when the FIFA World Cup was hosted in South Africa. The most 
violent attacks of 2008 will be addressed separately due to their severity and significance. 
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Table 1 
Number of Recorded Xenophobic Incidents in South Africa Per Year 
Year No. of incidents Percentage 
Pre-2005 9 4 
2005 4 2 
2006 9 4 
2007 9 4 
2008* 19 8 
2009 17 7 
2010 46 20 
2011 22 10 
2012 25 11 
2013 36 16 
2014 (to end-August) 32 14 
Total 228 100 
* Excluding May 2008 attacks   
Source: Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 35. 
 
Despite these figures, the South African government has at times chosen to adopt a denialist 
stance, as is the case with many nationalist and populist movements. In response to online press 
coverage of anti-migrant fueled violence in Port Elizabeth (Patel and Essa 2013, in Crush and 
Ramachandaran 2015, 48), one governmental spokesperson made the assertion that the media 
“painted an incorrect picture of…South Africa [that] was far from reality [, saying that] South 
Africa allows and welcomes foreign nationals” and has “strived to build a society based on the 
values of unity and togetherness” (Williams 2013, as quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 
48). A widely employed scapegoat statement was that of opportunistic criminals simply doing 
what they have always done rather than of South Africans being Afro-phobic. The spokesperson 
concluded: “The looting, displacement and killing of foreign nationals in South Africa should not 
be viewed as xenophobic attacks, but opportunistic criminal acts [emphasis ours] that have the 
potential to undermine the unity and cohesiveness of our communities” (Hirsi 2013, as quoted in 
Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 48). In 2013, after a large number of attacks on migrant owned 
shops in Port Elizabeth, the provincial police remarked that the “motive” for the violence should 
not be viewed as “xenophobic in nature, but a criminal element that has seized an opportunity 
[emphasis ours]” (Sapa 2013, as quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 49). Disdain for the 
importance of correctly characterizing the source of violence is detrimental for finding lasting 
solutions. Another case in point would be the former deputy trade and industry minister 
Elizabeth Thabethe’s remark about how, “You still find many spazas with African names, but 
when you go in to buy you find your Mohammeds and most of them are not even registered” 
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(Sowetan 2013, as quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 49). As well, ANC Secretary-
General Gwede Mantashe proclaimed at a 2014 election rally that, “if you go to Soweto, corner 
shops have been taken over by foreigners. We must do something about it” (Ginindza 2014, as 
quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 50). This latter sentiment from a high ranking 
member of the political party that possesses the greatest cultural capital is frightening. It has the 
power not only to validate xenophobia, but also to impede efforts to undo discriminatory 
mentalities. 
 
The Role of Gender in Exclusion 
The informal sector that many migrants participate in – either as a stepping stone to the formal 
sector or as a perpetual means of survival – offers differing opportunities to men and women. 
These differences occur due to prevailing, highly segregated, and traditionally held views on 
what work is appropriate for what gender; safety concerns that women have that men do not that 
discourage them from doing work that involves working and/or commuting alone at night; and, 
the fact that existing gender disparities propagate themselves. The major disparity in the effect 
gender has on migrants’ ability to support and advance themselves is the connectedness to the 
greater working community afforded to males over females (Blaauw, Pretorius, Schoeman, and 
Schenck 2012, 1339). Northcote and Dodson (2015) have also observed that gender can also 
have an effect on the extent to which communities made up of migrants and South Africans alike 
lend a helping hand to those in need. They cite a series of interviews in which a single father 
from Ghana, who was struggling to find work and thus afford to support himself and his 
daughter, was allowed to live rent free in the home of a Congolese woman in Cape Town, so that 
he could take care of his daughter’s needs. By contrast, a young, single mother from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported garnering less sympathy and support, as her 
youth and single-motherhood led people to assume negative stereotypes about her, including that 
she was promiscuous. Such perceptions occur as a result of a lack of contextualization of the 
landscape of rape as a weapon of war in the DRC, which has produced scores of children with 
single mothers who have needed to migrate to places such as South Africa.  
In terms of the type of work available, for women, work is isolating and often lacks 
opportunities to connect with others. The work available to men, on the other hand, is often 
along the lines of construction work on teams, where they can network with other workers, form 
social connections, practice speaking the local language, and learn where to find more similar 
work. Generally, in their research, Northcote and Dodson noted a “clear gender bias in how 
success is attained. In contrast to the casual jobs that the men were able to secure, work as a 
domestic laborer was comparatively socially isolating for the women involved. Male participants 
commonly worked as part of a team, such as on a construction site, thereby allowing them to 
build their language skills and open up a web of possible social and business connections. 
Domestic labor, such as washing dishes, doing laundry and cleaning homes, does not offer these 
same possibilities” to women (Northcote and Dodson 2015, 150). 
 
Legal Exclusion 
Christian Rogerson (2015) explains that the South African government has made concerted 
efforts to support small to medium enterprises in the informal sector through various initiatives 
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the creation of a specialized Ministry for 
small business announced in 2014. The importance of an entire dedicated ministry became 
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apparent when it was found that, in South Africa, up to 56 percent of the GDP is generated by 
small to medium enterprises. One of the DTI’s chief initiatives was to develop the Informal 
Business and Chamber Support, the mandate of which is to harvest the “vital importance of the 
informal business sector in broadening economic participation and creating decent employment” 
(Rogerson 2015, 232). In particular, the National Informal Business Development Strategy 
(NIBDS) was created to combat the perpetual survivalist culture that many informal sector 
workers and entrepreneurs were failing to graduate from to make it into secure income 
generating businesses. NIBDS’s goal is to craft “an enabling policy, regulatory, and 
programming environment promoting and supporting a developmental continuum for the 
graduation of Informal Businesses into the mainstream of the formal economy,” and especially, 
to place “particular focus on uplifting and empowering disadvantaged informal businesses of 
vulnerable groups like women, youth and disabled persons” (Rogerson 2015, 233). The Ministry 
will focus initiatives to foster and up-skill entrepreneurs, whereas the Department will provide 
financial and legal support to qualifying enterprises. The notion of “qualifying” enterprises here 
is an important one because it implicitly excludes migrant entrepreneurs, who, as discussed 
earlier, are at the foundation of the South African economy and continue to be a major source of 
growth at all levels. Although people with refugee and asylum-seeker status living and working 
in the country are legally permitted to work, the NIBDS and other governmental provisions are 
awarded on the basis of South African citizenship, and carry the explicit objective to increase 
South African labourers’ overall competitiveness in the domestic context (Rogerson 2015, 239). 
Seeing as how the NIBDS is a national government initiative, it goes without saying that it was 
designed to benefit the South African people. Thus, the specific goal to make South African 
informal sector workers more competitive than their non-South African counterparts is especially 
exclusionary, and indeed demonstrates an othering of the non-South African across spheres of 
identity: national, social, and ethnic. Official NIBDS documentation has consistently portrayed 
non-South Africans in a negative light, and as a threat. The strategy document reads: “there are 
no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners” and there is “no synergy 
between the DTI and Home Affairs in devising strategies and policies to control foreign business 
activities” (Rogerson 2015, 239). With regard to the Refugee Status Act of 1998, the document 
notes that the Act, “is still perceived by [the] majority [of] citizens to be too lenient to 
foreigners[,] giving them an unfair advantage over nationals” (Rogerson 2015, 239–40). 
Rogerson also observes that sections of the document selectively cite instances in Ghanaian, 
Indian, and Malaysian policy, in which foreign nationals are prevented from participating in 
segments of their informal economies and are banned from trading in certain areas (2015, 240). 
Rogerson argues that when the Department of Trade and Industry writes about the importance of 
cracking down on the trade of counterfeit goods, it is an indirect attack on migrant traders as they 
are often associated with those sales. 
A major component of the push for greater regulation of the informal sector, ostensibly to 
strengthen it, is the registering of businesses (Holmes 2013). Registered businesses can avail 
themselves of assistance from the government in the form of small business loans and business 
development support structures (e.g., skills training and access to technology) (Rogerson 2015, 
233–34). However, during attempts to pass the licensing rule that would operationalize 
registering informal businesses, the Department of Home Affairs requested that “foreigners 
whose status is not confirmed…should not be granted licences” (DTI 2014). In addition, the 
municipal government branches responsible for implementing licensing regulations made a call 
for community-based organizations to assist with implementation. Jonathan Crush has noted that 
Muyanga Nationalism and Xenophobia in South Africa 
 
	39 
this, “sounds suspiciously like an attempt to get South Africans on board to assist the police in 
identifying and rooting out foreign traders,” and argued that the licensing debacle is attempting 
to “make it so difficult for non-citizens to operate small businesses in the country that they will 
go home” (Crush 2013, as quoted in Rogerson 2015, 240–1). 
While some South Africans have exhibited highly xenophobic behavior, particularly in the 
significantly violent eruptions of 2008 and 2015, others have banded together, citing very 
logical, pragmatic reasons as to why they are open to living, working, and trading with other 
Africans. During the same series of xenophobic attacks, a female-led anti-xenophobic coalition 
gave interviews to the BBC. The women’s comments included: “They are the only shops from 
where we can buy things cheaply. The local businessmen are greedy and jealous”; “Even when [I 
am] short of R1, they give me the bread and tell me I can pay next time”; and, “When it is the 
middle of the month, they give me groceries and tell me I can pay them when I get my pension. 
They don’t even take my number or address, that is how much they trust us” (BBC News 2011). 
The contrast can be seen between this and another interview from 2011, when leaders from the 
community group that called itself the Greater Gauteng Business Forum remarked: “We want 
them [Somali spaza shop owners] to leave. Before, we said let them remain here because they are 
also human beings and they’re supposed to stay somewhere. Now we’re saying: Just close your 
shops and leave the area. We don’t like them, we don’t want them to be around townships any 
more. The government is supposed to take them to a camp somewhere, not allow them to come 
inside our townships” (Misago and Wilhelm-Solomon 2011). Here, South Africans demonstrate 
empathy towards the cause of the refugee, but not the migrant. The perceived threat arises when 
people feel that their space is being permanently infringed upon. 
 
Africa Hosts Itself 
Another way to look at the notion of one group or nationality claiming particular spaces is that it 
is a hypocritical practice, particularly in the case of Africans. Contrary to popular belief, it has 
been found that most Africans migrate for family, work, or study, rather than as a result of 
having to flee from poverty or socio-political strife, although these are also significant 
contributors (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 3). Only 14 percent of Africans leaving the continent 
are doing so as refugees or under refugee-like circumstances, which means that 86 percent are 
driven by ordinary social processes, such as moving to a new place for work, to live with a 
partner/spouse, or for education (Bakewell and Bonfiglio 2013, 4). Thus, I would argue that hope 
for the future of pan Africanism is twofold: first, Africa deserves credit for, in large part, hosting 
itself. While most western media outlets routinely broadcast that Europe is struggling with its 
refugee crisis, out of the top ten refugee-hosting countries, none are European, but five are 
African. In order of the number of refugees hosted, they are Ethiopia (736,000), Kenya 
(554,000), Uganda (477,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (383,000), and Chad 
(370,000) (UNHRC 2016). Schoumaker et al. have noted that most African migrations are not 
directed toward Europe, but toward other African countries, and also to the Gulf countries and 
the Americas (2015, as quoted in Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 3). While around 1.3 million 
refugees sought asylum in the European Union over the past year, 4.4 million did so in sub-
Saharan Africa. Additionally, the continent holds 19.5 million “people of concern” to the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (Hasan 2016). That point brings us to the second point of this 
paper surrounding the future of the pan Africanist project: the continent needs to get its own 
house in order. Countries on the continent need to work smarter as well as harder on creating 
conditions in which their citizens have no urgent incentive to emigrate, but rather, can participate 
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in a productive and growing society that attracts other investment. According to Zelinsky’s 
Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition, “processes of modernisation and economic development 
have historically coincided with increasing rural-to-urban migration followed by a subsequent 
increase in emigration. When societies become wealthy emigration decreases and immigration 
increases, leading to a mobility or migration transition, in which countries gradually transform 
from countries of net emigration into countries of net immigration” (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 
17). South Africa is a useful case study in this regard. While the inflow of other Africans signals 
its attractiveness as a relatively prosperous economy, the tension lies in that not being the 
experience of low income South Africans themselves, who find themselves not wanting to 
“share” what to them is an already sparse landscape of opportunity. 
 
Conclusion 
Central to dismantling xenophobia in the South African consciousness and in practice, from 
communities to all levels of government, is deconstructing the language surrounding “us” and 
“them.” Small Business Development Minister Lindiwe Zulu gave an address in 2014 that 
consistently referred to “foreigners” and South Africans as two distinct groups in direct 
competition for customers, transactions, and physical space. In reference to the perceived greater 
rates of success of migrant spaza shop owners, she said: “They must ask themselves how can 
they [foreigners] be successful in the same communities [where] others [locals] claim they can’t 
succeed…How are they able to make it when our people can’t. It is because they know business. 
It is in their blood” (Rogerson 2015, 244). This evokes colonial era divide-and-conquer 
ideologies, in which a group would be made out to be inherently more adept at something, with 
little to no sense of contextualizing the accurate source of disparities in terms of successfulness. 
One example is the appointment of the Tutsi in Rwanda as the collaborating class, who were 
privileged over the Hutu and Twa on the basis of physical features that more closely resembled 
European ones, such as longer, thinner noses and high cheekbones.  
With the rest of the world exhibiting varied forms of Afrophobia by imposing obstacles to 
traveling, working, and settling abroad, it is highly unnecessary for Africans to impose the same 
exclusion amongst themselves. Such exclusion is particularly troubling as it signals bad news for 
the future of pan Africanism. Secession is a phenomenon not new to the African continent: 
Eritrea, attempts at founding the Republic of Biafra, Somaliland, Western Sahara, and, most 
recently, South Sudan are prominent examples. The erection of new borders on the continent that 
already possesses the most is surely a move away from integration and toward a continental 
culture of nationalism, populism, and othering. Populism is not unique to Africa, however, as 
evidenced by the election of the 45th United States president, Donald Trump, the vote to exit the 
European Union and Theresa May’s unelected prime ministership, and the possibility of a Le 
Pen presidency in France. Migration is as human as procreation – we have been doing both since 
the origin of our species. Poet Teju Cole captures this sentiment in his poem writing: 
Moving for economic benefit is itself a matter of life and death. Because money is the 
universal language, and to be deprived of it is to be deprived of a voice while everyone else 
is shouting. Sometimes the gun aimed at your head is grinding poverty, or endless shabby 
struggle, or soul crushing tedium. 
Did all sixteen of your great great grandparents live, work, and die in the same town where 
you now live? If no, then you’re a child of migrants. 
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“OK, but where do we draw the line?” is a question you create in your head to distract you 
from your human duty to the other. If the line had been drawn in front of you instead of 
behind, you wouldn’t even be here now, wherever here might be. (Cole 2015) 
Fearful reactions to the free movement of people in search of a better life go against the grain 
of the natural progression of human development. This is not to say that unregulated movement 
is the solution, as there are very real threats involved in that as well. Terrorism, economic strain, 
and disease are issues all citizens of the world are concerned about, yet these too can be powerful 
notions that can incentivize cooperation rather than isolation and exclusion. In the context of 
Africa, the continent is too pertinent an example of how divide-and-conquer tactics weaken the 
social, political, and economic strength of states and societies. The South African government 
and people need to take responsibility for the country’s privileged position as the continent’s 
second largest economy. South Africa needs to devise comprehensive strategies to enable itself 
to play a practical and sustainable role in the uplifting of Africa’s people. As the world moves 
toward nationalism and populism, we must continually and critically reflect on the roots of this 
movement and dissect the fear and discrimination that drives it, in order to move away from a 
place in which nationality dictates the extent of one’s entitlement to dignity and humanity. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Mary Sibande is a female South African artist whose work delves into ideas of race, gender, and 
class from her perspective as a Black South African woman. Through her medium, a mannequin 
named Sophie made with silicone and fiberglass, she explores these realms by representing 
Sophie’s character in various dream states and attire. This paper examines the ambiguous nature 
of Sibande’s 2009 work, Caught in the Rapture, in which Sophie’s Victorian-style blue dress 
acts as the centerpiece, entailing both colonial and post-colonial histories. I propose that there are 
two conflicting interpretations that can be gathered from examining the installation: one that 
centers on the vulnerable nature of the piece, while the other highlights its aspects of strength. 
This creates an unlikely coexistence between two inherently opposing categorizations, which 
results in a dynamic and complex understanding of the work as a whole. 
Keywords: Sibande, Sophie, dress, strength, vulnerability 
 
 
Introduction 
A black spider web stretches out on a stark white background. A woman positioned in the center 
with outstretched arms pushes against the web with her head turned away in a defiant stance. The 
web entraps her –	 the mechanism that holds her hostage casting shadows onto the contrasting 
colored wall. The woman’s eyes are closed as she “wears” a blue ball-gown, a Victorian style 
dress, its fabric starched and unwrinkled. The dress alone immediately catches the eye with its 
vibrant color brilliant in a world of all black and white. The dress puffs out at both shoulders, the 
puffs leaning slightly left toward the background web. A blue collar with tiny white triangles 
facing out encircles the woman’s neck. Three buttons run down the front of her dress until they 
reach a white apron. The apron wraps around her waist with small square folds lining the bottom 
and sides of the material. 
This is Sophie. As the subject of the sculpture Caught in the Rapture (2009), she’s an alter 
ego of South African contemporary artist Mary Sibande, who lives and works in Johannesburg. 
Sibande, born in 1982, experienced the end of apartheid (1994) as well as the post-apartheid era, 
growing up a child of three generations of domestic workers – her great-grandmother, 
grandmother, and mother (Dodd 2010, 467). Originally, her dream was to become a fashion 
designer, but that dream didn’t come to fruition; nevertheless, her desire to design can be seen 
throughout her artwork. Caught in the Rapture is one sculpture in a series of many that focus on 
this particular character, who is named Sophie. Sibande uses fiberglass and silicone to make 
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casts of her own body as she poses for her artwork for this series. The result is a human-sized 
mannequin that provides a lifelike aura for the viewers (Dodd 2010, 467-468). 
As an artist who experienced her adult life post-apartheid, Sibande’s work differs from artists 
who experienced apartheid and created their works accordingly. Artists like Zwelidumile 
Geelboi Mgxaji Mslaba “Dumile” Feni, Sydney Kumalo, and Ezrom Legae created art that 
represented the human/bestial convergence or the animal-like qualities attributed to humans 
during this time. Black South Africans were seen as the animals in the artwork since they were 
being violated in inhumane ways. Artists depicted the egregious abuse that Black communities 
faced by creating distorted animals and humans merging with beasts into unrecognizable and 
horrifying images (Peffer 2009). After the 1982 Culture and Resistance Festival in Gaborone, 
Botswana, artists began to use political posters to explicitly state what they were fighting against: 
apartheid. They wanted their message of change to be clear and unambiguous and saw art as a 
tool to convey that feeling. One slogan that became very popular was: “Art is a weapon of the 
struggle” (Peffer 2009, 79). Later in the 1980s, abstract art began to rise in popularity, as 
workshop movements like the Triangle Artists’ Workshop (Triangle 2017) and the Thupelo 
Workshop (Thupelo 2017) allowed artists to learn techniques they could then apply to their own 
works in New York and Johannesburg, respectively. Through such workshops, artists were able 
to learn to express their inner emotions and focus on the medium of their art –	the paint itself –	
rather than on creating a recognizable image. Although the style was not appealing to many 
artists, since the explicitness of the struggle against apartheid promoted by the Culture and 
Resistance Festival was still in their minds, abstract art and the movements around it created a 
community environment among artists (Peffer 2009). 
As a South African artist, Sibande was no doubt familiar with these artists and the styles they 
created. Her work raises questions on gender, race, and class, taking on these issues with a 
character who tries to distance herself from the world in which these problems dominate. Like 
Caught in the Rapture, her other works in the series echo these ideas as they show Sophie in 
various costumes and dream states. Mary Corrigall (2015), research associate at the University of 
Johannesburg, views Caught in the Rapture as a piece that focuses fully on the artist, Sibande, 
and her created character, Sophie. Corrigall sees this artwork as being more than a piece that can 
be broadly applied to the experiences of Black South African women. She views both Sibande 
and Sophie as trying to escape from their current realities. For Sophie, it’s her job as a domestic 
servant; for Sibande, it’s her current reality. The web, for instance, is one that Sibande makes, 
both physically and symbolically. Corrigall argues that Sibande is therefore the architect of her 
own trap, and that this is enhanced by the fact that the casts of Sophie are made from Sibande’s 
own body, writing: “She has become enslaved by her aspirations, causing her to be embedded in 
another reality” (159). I agree with Corrigall’s escapist view of Sophie. Aside from that 
connection, our interpretations diverge, however, as I view this artwork as going beyond just 
Sophie and Sibande toward a larger societal context. 
In this paper, I will argue that Caught in the Rapture displays both the vulnerability of Black 
South African women as well as the inner strength they need to break free from stereotypes and 
oppression due to their gender. I will begin by examining another interpretation of the art piece, 
as well as detailing the development of the Sophie series and its influence in South Africa. Next, 
I will compare the presentation methods of and ideas expressed by artists Jane Alexander, 
Mmakgabo Mmapula Helen Sebidi, and Yinka Shonibare that can also be observed in Sibande’s 
works. I will then move to a deeper analysis of Sibande’s Caught in the Rapture, and conclude 
with thoughts on the future of the Sophie series. 
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Background 
Sibande’s Sophie series was originally created for a 2009 solo exhibition titled Long Live the 
Dead Queen, put on in honor of her grandmother, who bore the same name and served as her 
inspiration. Sophie’s transformations didn’t end there, though. Instead, more mannequins 
followed, clothed in an array of garments and placed in striking poses, each one possessing a 
universal quality – closed eyes – with the purpose being to illustrate that Sophie is journeying 
into a dream state where she escapes from her everyday domestic chores. She enters a world 
where she takes control and holds the power. Sibande chooses to represent Sophie as a mixed 
media installation rather than a painting, due to the significance of what a mannequin represents. 
Mary Corrigall (2015) states that, “Mannequins are associated with the subconscious, becoming 
conduits for the yearnings that plague the psyche.” Sibande’s work, then, takes on various layers, 
as Sophie’s longing to break free expresses not only her desires as an alter ego, but also 
Sibande’s own desires (147). 
Sophie, however, is not restricted to art exhibits in which Sibande participates; she reaches 
people outside the gallery walls also. In 2009 and 2010, the Sophie series left the confined walls 
of an art exhibit and journeyed throughout the inner city of Johannesburg for the Joburg Art Fair. 
Individuals unable to attend Sibande’s exhibits were able to see images of Sophie posted on 
billboards around the area. Enlarged prints of Sophie were placed on various buildings and 
billboards. The fair was held in order to turn the city into an art gallery, allowing people to view 
the artwork outside of the traditional enclosed location. The organizers of the “democratic 
exhibition” saw Sibande as a perfect choice for the event, as she was one of the few young black 
women working in mixed media. During the 2010 fair, nineteen prints of Sophie were displayed 
on nineteen buildings. Director of the Johannesburg arts, culture, and heritage department, 
Steven Sack, said that Sibande’s work “humanizes our tough and rough society,” and that he 
“hope[s] the citizens of Joburg notice and are engaged and moved by them [the prints]” (Davie 
2010, np). 
 
Stylistic Analysis 
Immersion 
Sculptor Jane Alexander creates installations with striking images that evoke both emotional and 
thoughtful responses in a way similar to Sibande. She uses life-sized sculptures to capture the 
onlooker’s attention in a way that questions the humanity of the figures represented in her work. 
While the appearance of the grotesque figures instantly accentuates their inhuman nature, it 
brings to light their human aspects too; the figures’ nudity results in a feeling of vulnerability –	a 
human characteristic. Alexander creates an “aesthetics of abjection” in which inhumanity and 
humanity combine so that the viewers cannot cast off that which they do not want to accept. 
They are forced to confront what makes the figures unlike them as much as like them (Bick 
2010, 33-34). This is an active journey for onlookers, as they must confront the figures presented 
to them, comprehend the human–inhuman connections represented in the figures, and then 
evaluate the artist’s overall statement. One such piece is Alexander’s famous Butcher Boys 
(1986), a sculpture of three mutilated figures sitting on a bench. Horns extend from their heads; 
what appear to be cut marks go down their chests, as if something inside has been taken out; 
their ears are removed, mouths covered, and sexes fused; and their black eyes stare up and off to 
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the side. This piece is far from one that can be understood with a single glance; it requires further 
discussion to gain understanding of its meaning (Peffer 2009, 64). 
Both Alexander and Sibande force their audiences to engage with their artwork. While 
Sibande does not use emotions such as horror to provide the impact of her message, like 
Alexander, she finds an effective method to capture viewers, specifically through her use of 
excessive dress material, her lifelike mannequins, and her mixed media. Excessive clothing 
serves as a trademark of her style. The blue dress Sophie wears seems excessive, yet that is one 
of the reasons Sibande’s artwork catches the eye. It is the first place to which the eye is drawn, 
essentially pulling one into the dream with its central focus in the piece. Her human-scaled 
mannequins, made from the casts of her own body, lend realism to her work. In Caught in the 
Rapture, characteristics such as Sophie’s neck veins, hand veins, and middle of the arm 
indentions all add to Sibande’s realistic approach, which is eye catching to the observer. Dress 
material, Silicon, fiberglass, thread, and other materials are all used to enhance Sophie’s dreams, 
bringing color, realism, and everyday objects into a world of fantasy. 
 
The Body 
Mmakgabo Mmapula Helen Sebidi focuses on gender and racial aspects similar to those in 
Sibande’s work by highlighting women’s roles in Africa. Sebidi focuses on gender from the 
female perspective, bringing to light women’s roles in the home and community. In her work, 
Black women serve as the central focal point. Through pastel and paper collages, she produces 
art that emphasizes the roles that women play in South Africa. As a female who grew up and 
lived during the apartheid era, she sees women as the “bearers of tradition” and of “the next 
generation of children” (Peffer 2009, 70). They have faced misogyny, been the primary 
breadwinners, and been abused as domestic servants for white employers, providing them with 
valuable insight into the problems that face South African society. In Where is My Home? The 
Mischief of the Township (1988), arms, legs, and faces are distorted and are located on various 
places on the canvas. Bright colors blend into one another, making it harder to distinguish 
between the faces and the body parts. Yet, there is a woman in the center of it all. Although 
Sebidi’s collages appear dysfunctional and chaotic, especially during the period when artists 
were portraying bestial qualities in humans, in Sebidi’s work overall, a woman serves as the 
“symbol of stasis within chaos” (Peffer 2009, 70). 
Gender and race issues are tackled on a subconscious level in Sibande’s work, which focuses 
on the maid – a common profession of Black women during apartheid. Sibande and Sebidi focus 
on the female perspective, with race being equally important to both artists, specifically for 
Black women, although gender is broadly explored in their work. In contrast to Sebidi’s method, 
Sibande chooses to bring forth her message with Sophie’s character only. Almost all of 
Sibande’s early works showcase Sophie interacting with the Victorian upper class world without 
others present. Even so, Sophie does not represent one female; she represents South African 
Black women as a whole. Sibande, although using her own body, therefore serves as a 
spokeswoman as she broaches the gender issues she sees women facing through an artistic 
perspective. Thus, by using her own body to create Sophie and not just a sculpture made from 
her imagination, she is connecting herself with the women she strives to represent. She is a 
Black, South African woman, and she is part of the group for which she means to speak – not 
from a detached standpoint, but from an intimate one that she can relate to firsthand. 
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Excess 
British-Nigerian artist, Yinka Shonibare, makes political statements with his installation pieces. 
His work aligns with Sibande’s on issues of class, delving into discussions of context and 
extravagance through the medium of clothing. His signature headless mannequins, a reminder of 
the French Revolution beheadings (1789-1799), work to Africanize Victorian leisure activities 
by displaying skin tones of indeterminate ethnicities and through the use of fabrics of mixed 
authenticities (Stilling 2013, 301). The fabrics that Shonibare uses appear to be African, yet their 
origins prove otherwise, thereby questioning what it means for an item to be labeled authentic in 
one area over another (Stilling 2013, 301). He is best known for his use of batik clothing and his 
use of it in formal Victorian designs, for the purpose of critiquing colonialism through the 
installations’ clothing. For Shonibare, it is the batik cloth that has a complex background. The 
Dutch wax technique used in producing the fabric, associated with an African origin, is in fact 
from Indonesia, although it travelled to both Holland and Manchester prior. Only after those 
exports did it arrive in Africa, where it is now considered traditional African wear (Tolia-Kelly 
and Morris 2004, 154). One such work by Shonibare that uses the cloth is titled Yinka Shonibare 
Dresses Britannia (2001). The statue, located in front of the Tate Britain, is significant for two 
reasons: one, its connection to the Victorian ideas of empire and nationhood; and two, its link to 
Henry Tate’s acquisition of wealth through the sugar trade. This statue, or symbol, serves to re-
contextualize the colonizer “through the embodiment of ‘the colonized,’” providing a nuance in 
the meaning of the artwork ((Tolia-Kelly and Morris 2004, 155).  
Shonibare’s work further explores the idea of excess, specifically focusing on its destructive 
road, as well as power relations. As Downey states, Shonibare “comments on power, or the 
deconstruction of power… and use(s) notions of excess as a way to represent that power –	
deconstructing things within that” (2005, 25). The Last Supper (2013) is a perfect example of 
excess: the headless figures sit and stand around a table filled with food, and there is a plethora 
of colors to represent the food and clothing. While a modern recreation of Leonardo Da Vinci’s 
1498 version, it is also reminiscent of the Berlin Conference of 1884 and the European powers’ 
colonial quest for more power in Africa. The underlying political meaning of the piece presents 
itself through symbolism, with the food, representing Africa, being distributed among the 
figures, which represent those in attendance at the conference. It also adds to his Scramble For 
Africa (2003) installation piece that explicitly relates to the historical event. Yet, there is a reason 
for his focus on excess. In 2004, he screened Un Ballo in Maschera, his first film, which 
investigates what excess eventually becomes – in his words: “the primitive side of humanity” 
(Downey 2005, 28).  
In Caught in the Rapture, Sibande uses Sophie’s wearing of the dress to call into question a 
deeper analysis of the work’s meaning through a re-contextualization process similar to 
Shonibare’s. Through dress alone, Sophie ascends to the position of madame, with the dress’s 
size and length varying between exhibits. Although, the message associated with the outfit she 
wears is not as evident as it might initially appear. After 1994, the official end of apartheid, a 
new fashion of dress began to be marketed as “South African fashion” by local designers, who 
wanted their clothing to be associated with a new South African identity. Fashion and shifts in 
dress are not merely changes in fads, though. The creation of clothing that is not prescribed by 
class allows anyone to wear the clothing if they have similar work opportunities, creating a link 
between the clothing and democracy. For Sophie, the Victorian style dress represents a power 
that was once held by whites during apartheid, and even earlier, during colonial times. Her 
clothing is therefore a symbol. However, she hones those symbols that represent immobility in 
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class and democratizes them, by wearing the dress even though she’s a servant (Corrigall 2015, 
151-152).  
Sibande’s purposeful use of excess extends beyond the aforementioned method of grasping 
onlookers’ attention. Sophie’s clothing calls to mind the wealth during the Victorian era among 
those who had the means to display it. The raw emotion of greed resulted in such a time period, 
leading to the acquisition of the means to satisfy that desire. As artists, both Shonibare and 
Sibande realize that, by intentionally using excess as a concept, whether through clothing or 
other signs of lavishness, they can expose the path that excess leads to among those who choose 
to engage in and focus on it. 
 
Artistic Juxtaposition 
The captivating style of Sibande’s work along with her views on race, gender, class, and excess 
serve as a foundation to the investigation of Caught in the Rapture. Even though it appears as an 
installation piece focusing solely on Sophie’s stuck position in a spider’s web, there is more 
beneath the surface. There is an ambiguity to the overall symbolism of the piece. Is Sophie a 
representation of the victimization of Black South African women because of their race and also 
because of their gender? Or, is her position an exemplification of the strength needed to 
overcome gender issues that are still a problem concerning Black South African women? The 
answer is both. While those questions pose two exclusive interpretations, the artwork requires an 
inclusive one that creates a juxtaposition of two opposing characterizations – that of vulnerability 
and strength. None of Sophie’s gestures are superfluous, because each one conveys a purpose 
and message, allowing an analysis of struggle and perseverance. This dynamic back-and-forth 
interpretation can be drawn from the piece by viewing it holistically, and also by analyzing other 
aspects that make it similar to Sibande’s other works and those that make it unique. These 
include: the title and its different meanings, the spider web and its negative and positive 
connotations, the Victorian wear of Sophie and its significance, and the idea of freedom and its 
liberations. 
In Sibande’s Long Live the Dead Queen collection, there is an expression of strength that 
resonates among her various art pieces as the figures all hold positions of power. Why, then, is 
Sophie in a vulnerable stance in Caught in the Rapture? The Reign (2010), in particular, shows 
Sophie wearing a blue dress as she sits on a reared up horse. The artwork is a reminder of the 
Jacques Louis David painting Napoleon Crossing the Alps (1801) – an art piece exuding power. 
Sophie holds a similar power as she sits on top of the horse; yet, that position is in opposition to 
the seemingly vulnerable one in Caught in the Rapture. Even in other collections, Sophie shows 
power and strength in some fashion or another, whether it is subtle or overt. Don’t Make Them 
Like They Used To (2008) evinces Sophie’s inner strength as she knits cloth with the Superman 
symbol on it, while the Everything Not Lost (2011) collection, where Sophie is not only dressed 
in army attire, but also multiplied in number, is a blatant example of strength at its fullest. 
 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability appears in the essence of the piece, as the artwork itself is a personal dream state of 
one female, namely Sophie, being exposed to the viewers that observe her. If mannequins are the 
channels through which the psyche can express its yearnings, as Corrigall suggests, then the 
artist’s message and medium become one. Sophie yearns to be free from the work she must do; 
therefore, her dreams pull her out of the pressing job she is to perform as well as take her away 
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from the realities of the world in which she lives. Unfortunately, her dream is just that – a dream. 
Even if she imagines being part of a higher class, in reality this is not the case. The spider web 
signals that fact by both catching and keeping her in that one position. Her dreams are only in her 
mind; they do not stretch into the real world. Sophie may not want that to be true, as shown by 
her pushing away from the web, but it is. She is left vulnerable to the onlookers who receive an 
intimate glimpse of her dream.  
Sibande’s desires are left open for others to see as well. Her collection, which focuses on 
race, gender, and class, marks stances that she has taken and expressed through art. Sophie’s 
presence emphasizes that point; through her, Sibande’s desire for a more freeing future for Black 
South African women is there for others to see. The viewers can critique Sibande’s art piece and 
judge for themselves if they agree with the artist or not. Either way, Sibande has revealed her 
thoughts. As Sophie stands there wearing her unmissable blue dress with the spider web behind 
her, both she and Sibande are opening themselves up to their dreams. Interestingly, Sophie’s 
dream lies in separation from her work as a domestic servant, while Sibande’s dream is 
expressed through her work as an artist.  
According to Random House Dictionary, one meaning of the word “rapture,” from the 
piece’s title, is “the carrying of a person to another place or sphere of existence.” Sophie is 
caught in another place, namely her dreams. This takes on an additional layer since the viewer is 
involved in this process as well. Sophie is not the only one experiencing this journey from reality 
to the imaginary; every viewer who engages with the artwork is also carried away to another 
place. While observing it, the viewer is essentially taken from the present world of being inside 
the art gallery into a world of dreams. The difference, though, is that Sophie’s dream is the one 
being exposed. There is also a significance in the fact that Sibande creates the casts from her own 
body. She becomes vulnerable by the mere act of using the casts in her creation of Sophie, who 
Sibande claims is her alter ego. By making that assertion, Sibande is showing that there may be 
more behind the adoption than what is readily apparent. The artist may have desires that she 
dreams about, but that she feels are confined to her imagination.  
Sophie’s trapped position in the spider web as she pushes against it, trying to get away but 
unable to do so, displays helplessness as she stands in this powerless position. The spider web 
could be representative of the immobility that Black women face in South Africa. During the 
apartheid years, while artwork focused on the struggle, there were only a few artists who called 
attention to the struggle that women faced. One female South African artist, namely Sebidi, was 
in that small number. Since Sibande experienced apartheid as a child, her work draws attention 
to current issues surrounding women, making Sophie’s position a symbol of stasis in regard to 
the restraints women face. As stated by Sibande, Sophie’s body serves “as a tool to express 
concerns in the stereotypical depiction of women, particularly black women” (Stielau, n.d.). 
There is a vulnerability in being victimized because of one’s gender, and by making Sophie the 
center of the piece, like the females in Sebidi’s work, Sibande is choosing to highlight women 
and their struggles.  
The bright blue Victorian-style dress itself represents an era of confinement. Although the 
blue dress is domestic wear, as shown by the clean white apron around Sophie’s waist, the dress 
has an excess of material which would not have been used for a domestic servant’s attire; big, 
ball gown structured dresses would have been restricted to the wealthy class. Sophie is stuck to 
the spider’s web where she is caught, showcasing this symbol of the immobility that has been 
felt by women through the Victorian era, during apartheid, and post-apartheid. Sophie’s pose 
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displays the oppression of women that still exists and it positions her as a victim of societal 
views of her based on her gender.  
The use of the dress goes beyond that of the Victorian reference, however. An issue that 
Black African women have to face is one of a sexual nature. Africa as a whole has been viewed 
in a sexual light (Osha 2004, 92), art being an avenue through which to enhance this outlook. 
Artists engaged in settler primitivism in the twentieth century. One such artist was Alexis Preller, 
who, while painting images of Ndebele culture, did not occlude a sexual appeal, as seen in 
Mapogga I (1951): a faceless woman is seated with her breasts above her clothing, with the 
holistic view of the woman alluding to the female genitalia (Peffer 2009, 17–18). Constance 
Larrabee, a photographer, numbered her pictures instead of titling them, giving no further 
information about her subjects except one moment captured through a camera lens (Peffer 2009, 
16). Both artists took away the individualism of their subjects; and, in Preller’s case, he saturated 
his images with sexual innuendos. As the central focal point in Caught in the Rapture, Sophie is 
open to being exposed within this focalized view. Sibande reacts to the stereotypical view of 
Black African women by desexualizing Sophie through the excess of her gown. Instead of the 
viewer seeing Sophie as a sexualized female, the ball gown dress takes away the outline of her 
body that a tight-fitting dress would show. The sexual and vulnerable exposure is further 
critiqued by Sibande through the turning of Sophie’s head, reinforcing the fact that she rejects 
being viewed in such a way and stressing that women should be regarded apart from their 
sexuality.  
The idea of strived-for freedom, both physical and mental, takes form in the work, as 
Sophie’s attempt to push away from the web represents an effort to achieve true freedom. There 
is still a susceptibility that women face because of their gender, not only in the roles they may try 
to attain, whether socially or economically, but also in their minds. They must believe they can 
overcome the pressures they are facing and attain what may have been denied them due to their 
gender. The act of doing so, though, is not an easy task. The spider web’s sticky component 
holds Sophie in place, just as reinforced ideas about women have worked to hold them within a 
stereotyped scope both in the past and in the present. Sibande has talked about how South Africa 
as a whole is working to obtain the mental freedom that the country has attained physically. She 
states that, “Although one can argue the freedom of our country under the new democratic 
dispensation many members of the South African society are not free in their minds haunted as 
they are by lingering self-doubts” (Stielau n.d.). Those doubts are the spider web that holds the 
people in place. They hold women in place. 
 
Strength 
Nevertheless, perseverance is not void in the artwork in the least. There is an inner strength 
evinced through the work in a similar manner as vulnerability. One example is the title of the 
artwork, explored earlier. Random House Dictionary provides another possible meaning to the 
word “rapture”: “caught in the state of delight” or “ecstatic joy.” While this additional meaning 
may not at first be clearly evident, just as the former definition, it reveals itself in the piece upon 
observation. When looking at Sophie’s head posture – turned away – and facial expression – 
eyes closed – the sight of joy is not clearly evident. There are no physical signs of joy on her face 
(e.g., a smile), and her facial expression looks calm, arguably blank. So where is this joy visible? 
The answer is in Sophie’s mind, or her subconscious. The dream world that the installation 
presents is a place she has escaped to and found refuge in. There are no racial, gender, or class 
issues there; it is just her and her elevated status. Therefore, she is overjoyed, not in her awake 
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state, but in her dream state. Instead of constantly thinking about herself as a maid, she chooses 
to take her mind off of that fact. Her strength comes from reaching beyond what’s currently 
available to her. She’s pushing toward a dream in a way that contemporary South African 
women are pushing toward their dream of removing gender-based stereotypes.  
The pushing away from the web may serve as an attempt to reject the view that Black women 
are part of a lower class – the turning of Sophie’s head adding to the fact, by showing a 
separation from that very assessment. From an apartheid standpoint, Sibande’s central focus of 
Sophie in the installation piece honors the women during this time, by showing that they were a 
central part of South African society and served as a symbol of strength. This viewpoint further 
aligns Sibande’s work with Sebidi’s because both women realize the importance of speaking on 
behalf of women. Part of this honoring process is sculpting not a story of tragedy and oppression, 
but one of survival and determination. There may have been little mobility for women due to 
their race, gender, and class, but even so, they still found a way to help provide for their families 
(Salo 2007, 189–90). The women may have been stuck due to the confines of their society; 
nonetheless, they made it through. 
The Victorian dress may have a history of confinement and represent signs of stasis, but that 
doesn’t mean that its symbolism is restricted to that historical meaning. By placing such a dress 
on a maid, Sibande could be attempting to re-contextualize it. The Herero women in Namibia 
have done just that with the Victorian style dresses they have been wearing for over a century, 
transforming the style into one that symbolizes perseverance. They even wear petticoats, to add 
to the fullness of their dresses. Lutz Marten, a linguist at London’s School of Oriental and 
African studies specializing in the Herero tribe, states that the dress, which was introduced to the 
Namibians in the early 1900s, “reflects a strong sense of history and the memory of national 
rebuilding after the [Herero-German] 1904 war. It also provides a sense of cultural identity in 
general, in the historical context and in the context of modern-day Namibia” (as cited in Wither 
2011). The attire represents the strength of a country rebuilding after a war, and is a sign of 
history and remembrance and a nation rebuilt (Wither 2011). Like Shonibare’s re-
contextualization of the statue of Britannia and Corrigall’s statement concerning the democratic 
re-contextualization of clothing, Sophie’s attire could be indicative of more than a structured and 
immobile society. The attire may serve as a reminder of the past, but one to learn from and not 
one to repeat. 
There is a sense of freedom in strength, a concept presented in this particular piece. In 
Sibande’s other works, Sophie’s head is covered in some way, whether with her white head scarf 
or with purple tendrils, as found in Sibande’s later works. However, for Caught in the Rapture, 
Sibande chooses not to include any article on Sophie’s head. Her braids hang down without any 
restraint for others to see. The lack of a head scarf could represent a freedom that Sophie is 
experiencing – one that can only be obtained through breaking free from the confines that those 
in society have placed on her because she’s a woman. Moving past those restraints is not easy, 
but she attempts to do so anyway, knowing that pushing for a better future is better than 
accepting the realities that she currently faces.  
Additionally, the artwork embodies a religious strength that is not readily apparent, but that is 
nonetheless present. In Christian doctrine, the Rapture refers to the return of Jesus, when 
Christians will leave this earth, or be caught up, to meet with Jesus in the sky on the way to 
heaven. However, with that image in mind, in viewing Sibande’s installation piece, one may 
wonder why Sibande chose this particular title. Her work, though, does have Christian 
influences. In one interview, she stated that her fabrics were inspired by the South African 
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Zionist churches: “I like them: they call themselves the ‘Soldiers of God’ and you should see 
them when they go to church – they put on their starchy clothes…That’s fashion!…That’s how I 
constructed Sophie” (Balboa-Pöysti 2011). From this statement, it is clear that the starched 
clothing Sophie wears has a religious origin.  
Building on that insight, the title could signify the wait of the Zionist members for the 
Rapture. Sophie, in her blue attire, may represent one of those members. If this interpretation is 
taken to its maximum, this means that the spider web loses its negative connotation of 
immobility and stasis and takes on a positive one. The believer (i.e., Sophie) is firmly rooted in 
her faith. The sticky spider web – her faith – keeps her grounded and immovable, with her 
position in the spider web adding to that viewpoint. She is in the very center of the web, like a 
Christian’s faith in God should be at the center of one’s life. If a person maintains such a faith, 
then they will be caught up in the Rapture.  
Caught in the Rapture challenges viewers to think beyond categorizations of race, gender, 
and class. For example, a person should be defined by more than their gender, although societies 
tend to judge and place individuals into isolated categories. Such categories do not encompass 
the complete nature of a person and are unable to provide insight into one’s personality and 
character. The spider web traps Sophie, exposing her race, gender, and class – she is a Black 
South African woman who is part of a lower class, in accordance with her Victorian class status. 
However, Sophie is more than these descriptions. She may be a mother, a sister, or a wife; she 
may be the person others go to in her community. Her aspirations and talents are there if only 
one searches for them. Observing her race, her gender, or her class will not reveal those aspects 
about her. So, while society may try to confine her based on only one aspect of her life, such 
confinement can be changed by critiquing that view – by pushing away from that web. 
 
Conclusion: Sophie’s Metamorphosis 
Nonetheless, before an artwork can be interpreted in such a manner, an artist must find a way to 
engage those who will be viewing it. In order to have onlookers engage with the piece, they must 
first be drawn to it. Before they can be carried away into the world of dreams, they must choose 
to give more than a cursory glance.  
In 2013, Sibande decided to engage viewers in a new way, or at least with a new alter ego. 
Sibande stated that it was time for her to move on from Sophie, and began transforming the maid 
into a new image. The artist needed to challenge herself with something new. In an interview 
pertaining to her new collection, The Purple Shall Reign, she stated: “I’m searching for the next 
identity, I am in search of my identity.” She views the color as a representation of herself, 
drawing from a 2009 installation piece in which Sophie was adorned in purple (Martin 2013). 
This collection was thus titled to emphasize Sibande’s change from Sophie to a new alter ego 
who would better represent her. The new character wears all purple, a color of royalty, and in 
one of the works, she is surrounded by root-like figurines – the roots symbolizing the artist’s 
need for growth. According to Sibande, color, as a whole, is important in South Africa: “Colour 
places you, colour tells where you are within the geography of South Africa” (Krouse 2013). The 
title of her new collection actually references an historical event – a 1989 anti-apartheid protest, 
where the police sprayed the protestors with purple dye so that they could spot them as they ran 
away (Krouse 2013).  
That fact alone is evidence that her political and non-political messages will not stop with 
Sophie, but will continue on into Sibande’s future work. Even though she’s moving away from 
Sophie, she is still drawing inspiration from the apartheid era, while coming from a post-
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apartheid standpoint. Caught in the Rapture, like many of Sibande’s other works, is not an 
artwork that is lovely to behold, but has no depth; instead, it stimulates questions about its 
meaning. It is one of many works that allows a deeper look into the struggles Black South 
African women face as they continue to fight for women’s rights. 
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“In overthrowing me, you have cut down in Saint-Domingue only the trunk of the tree of the 
liberty of the blacks; it will grow back from the roots, because they are deep and numerous” 
(278). Laurent Dubois’ Avengers of the New World is a thorough account of the events that led to 
the Haitian Revolution, the rebellion itself, and how it affected contemporary world powers. The 
author shows that the enslaved persons of Saint Domingue had all the elements necessary to 
incite a revolution and that they made adequate use of them. However, by exploring the recurring 
themes of leadership and freedom, the author also exposes both weaknesses and strengths of the 
Haitian regime. Ultimately, the strengths of Saint Domingue as a colony were a combination 
powerful enough to transform it into the country of Haiti. 
The theme of leadership in this book begins with the nation of France and its relationship 
with the colony of Saint Domingue. In the eighteenth century, France was engaged in a 
revolutionary war against the monarchy by constantly citing colony members’ rights as humans. 
This was counterintuitive to the system of slavery, a fact which was acknowledged by the slaves 
as well as by abolitionists in Saint Domingue. The war in France created division in the colonies 
and resulted in two groups being continually at odds: that of the abolitionists and the staunchly 
pro-slave planters. This dissension was recognized by slaves and gave them an ally. Whites from 
the island divided themselves into two governing bodies with competing ideologies – France 
gave them control over domestic policy, and as a result there was confusion and stratification in 
Saint Domingue. 
From this book, the reviewer got the sense that there was no single leader that could be held 
directly responsible for the rebellion in its entirety. Leaders came and went during the revolution, 
but this did not have a negative effect on the progress of slaves. Boukman, Jean-Francois, and 
Biassou were among a few notable insurgent leaders. After his death, Boukman was seen as a 
martyr by rebels, while the surviving leaders dealt in the formalities with White planters. The 
story laid out by Dubois does not depict the rebels as needing a large amount of military 
guidance. The men fighting this war had recently come from Africa and were experienced in 
battle. For example, a large number of slaves were from the war-torn country of the Congo and 
were accustomed to fighting tactics; thus, they knew to hide in the trees and jump out to attack 
White planters. 
In contrast, upon gaining the people their freedom, the indisputable leader of Saint Domingue 
was Toussaint Louverture. The description the author gives of the way Louverture went about 
consolidating power and crushing anyone who stood in his way reads as a critique of post-war 
leadership in Haiti. He mobilized a large army of former slaves and continued goading Black 
non-workers into going back to plantations and farming, but this time for pay. As the enslaved 
Blacks of Saint Domingue began to pull themselves up and out of their current situation in the 
unproductive war-torn state, Toussaint Louverture made connections with other countries, such 
as the United States, and became increasingly paranoid of other leaders. For example, he 
engaged in civil war with his former ally, André Rigaud, who was the only other leader of 
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significance in Saint Domingue at the time. He framed Rigaud as anti-Black (which in this case 
refers to those insurgents distinctly African), and moreover said that Free Coloreds in general 
were against the colony. 
In addition to his paranoia, Louverture became a dictator over all of the former slaves and 
Free Coloreds. He believed that laziness was evil and made laws saying that anyone who was not 
in the military or working would be severely punished. Louverture was becoming like the planter 
class they had fought to free themselves from – why would a self-proclaimed Black leader put 
his people in a position to feel like slaves again? This could have been due to the fact that the 
concept of leadership was not only based on how the people of Saint Domingue viewed the head 
of the nation, but also how the nation was perceived by other world powers. The people had to 
work in order to maintain the colony’s sought after sugar production as well as other goods for 
export. Furthermore, to facilitate trade, the nation had to be appealing enough for countries to go 
against France. Dubois discusses the United States making a trade agreement with the former 
colony, which they kept from France as long as they could. 
The theme of freedom is also a large part of the story of the Haitian revolution, and 
presumably the reason why there was a revolution in the first place. Yet, how was freedom being 
defined? Was it static or changing over time, did it have a different meaning for every person? 
Before the full scale revolt occurred, there were attempts by small groups and individuals to gain 
better conditions for enslaved persons. For example, Julien Raimond was well known in the 
colonies for his fight against racial discrimination and prejudice. Others wanted to improve the 
condition of slaves, coinciding with Enlightenment rhetoric, through the gradual abolition of 
slavery (72). Those who advocated for the outright abolition of slavery were included in the 
Société des Amis des Noires. 
It seemed that the French Revolution was at large what caused demands to escalate. The 
people of France were fighting for their human rights. They referenced the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man in their battle as well, which spread to Saint Domingue. This was motivation for 
slaves to seek out their own rights as human beings, because they were able to see how flawed it 
was that the people of France would own slaves while fighting for rights. Freedom was certainly 
not a static idea, but one that was changing over time. The concept was responsive to what was 
going on in France and adapted to what was going on in Saint Domingue. 
The author also demonstrates how the definition of freedom conformed to different groups of 
people. The White, Free Colored, and Black definitions of freedom were completely different. 
Whites were already free and were downright resistant to any attempts to extend rights to any 
other groups. Abolitionists in the colonies argued for political representation for Free Coloreds: 
“how, they demanded, could the National Assembly allow one group of France’s citizens to so 
flagrantly oppress another group in this way?” (83). However, certain colonial representatives in 
the National Assembly, such as Moreau de St. Méry, argued that masters were kind to Free 
Coloreds and created the class in the first place. 
Freedom for the Colored class was also seen as a vehicle for political representation and their 
interests aligned more so with that of abolitionists. One leader of a Free Colored uprising, Ogé, 
compared the rights they were asking for to those of the Third Estate in France. And while these 
protests went ignored for the most part in the colony, the French government made attempts to 
placate the lower classes. The National Assembly made a decree that anyone over the age of 
twenty-five who owned property could vote in elections. However, the terms were pointedly 
ambiguous, which led to Free Coloreds having to petition and fight for this right to apply to 
them. 
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The author shows that Black slaves had a more radical idea of freedom that escalated over 
time. Initially, slaves wanted an improved quality of life, which included: masters not whipping 
them and three free days a week. However, because these improvements were not a reality, 
slaves began organize uprisings. Once these uprisings grew and more slaves became involved, 
leaders attempted to negotiate for freedom with white planters. Yet the Whites did not want to 
negotiate – they only wanted slaves back on their plantations. These revolts changed the balance 
of power, and so White planters reluctantly offered freedom to many slave rebellion leaders and 
organized insurgents into policing groups. Slaves fought for quality of life issues because they 
heard that there was a decree granting them rights that had gone unenforced. And they knew that 
this was their plight alone, not that of Free Coloreds and certainly not that of Whites. After the 
uprisings began, slaves were not only fighting for an improvement in their quality of life but 
ultimately for their freedom. The descriptions Dubois provides demonstrate that the idea of 
freedom developed out of certain concessions made by Whites up until the end of the system of 
slavery. 
Although this is a historical text, the author ended each chapter on a clever note or a 
cliffhanger, which induced the reader to turn page after page. He was also able to make use of 
different literary techniques such as puns and other plays on words to retain the reader’s interest. 
For the most part, the organization of this book was coherent, however, at certain points the 
chronology was a bit unclear. Possibly this was due to way the events unfolded in history. These 
events occurred in such quick succession that perhaps the author chose to write in that manner as 
well. The use of images was beneficial to help the reader keep in mind the actors involved in the 
book. While certainly a text worth reading, the book was somewhat lengthy for the reviewer’s 
taste, and there were several gory details that could have been eliminated without sacrificing any 
historical information. Lastly, in the reviewer’s opinion, Dubois used a plethora of sources, 
however there were a great many from Paris. It is possible that the records in France may contain 
biased information considering Saint Domingue removed itself from the power of the mother 
country. Dubois utilized a multitude of sources, both biased and unbiased, in order to provide a 
detailed account of the Haitian Revolution and acknowledge those who played an instrumental 
role in its success. 
Freedom and leadership were among the most important themes in this book. They were the 
motivation and the direction, respectively, for the Haitian revolution. Throughout its history, 
Haiti has consistently been scorned by other world powers. Not to mention all of the tragedy that 
has befallen the country over the years, such as the AIDs epidemic of the mid 1970s and the 
earthquake that devastated millions of Haitians in March of 2010, to name a few notable events. 
This book allowed me to gain a better understanding of the title that everyone so proudly 
proclaims for the island – the first free Black nation! Haiti made sacrifices for its well-deserved 
liberty, yet I wonder if any other colony might have engaged the numerous oppressors of 
enslaved persons. Lastly, I admire the “all or nothing” approach the Haitians took with the revolt, 
and it is to that mentality I would attribute the majority of their success. 
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